中国在南中国海的两手抓战略
What do the governments of Belarus, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Russia have in common, apart from their lack of enthusiasm for participatory democracy?
白俄罗斯、文莱、柬埔寨、老挝和俄罗斯几国的政府除了都对参与式民主没兴趣之外，还有什么共同之处呢？
Beijing claims they have all recently come out in support of its position on the South China Sea. It says they back its arguments, either that maritime disputes should be resolved bilaterally or that the arbitration case brought by the Philippines against Beijing’s claims is illegitimate.
中国政府宣布上述政府最近都站出来支持其在南中国海的立场，称它们支持自己的观点，包括海上纠纷应通过双边协商解决，以及菲律宾对中国的领土主张提出的仲裁案是不合法的。
This is no accident. A judgment on the Philippines case is expected within months. Beijing is working hard to persuade other countries that the court of arbitration in The Hague has no right to adjudicate on its claims.
此事绝非偶然。菲律宾提出的仲裁案预计将在数月内得出裁决。北京方面正努力说服其他国家相信，海牙仲裁法庭无权对中国的主张作出裁决。
During recent weeks, Wang Yi, the wily Chinese foreign minister, has been courting counterparts with renewed vigour, with visits to Brunei, Cambodia and Laos designed to keep Southeast Asia divided in its approach to China.
近几周来，深谋远虑的中国外长王毅一直以充沛的精力拜访同行，访问了文莱、柬埔寨和老挝，意图分化东南亚对中国的态度。
Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, last week became the latest senior diplomat to side with China’s opposition to external interference — read the US — in the South China Sea.
俄罗斯外长谢尔盖•拉夫罗夫(Sergei Lavrov)上周成为支持中国立场的最新一位高级外交官，表示反对对南中国海问题的外部干预——意指美国。
China has drawn huge attention — and criticism — for its construction of islands and military facilities on contested reefs. But diplomacy is an equally important part of its strategy for dominating these waters, which contain rich fisheries, vast oil and gas reserves and key global trade routes.
中国的填海造岛、以及在争议性岛礁上建造军事设施的举动，已引起极大关注与批评，但外交同样是其主导这片海域的重要策略。该海域含有丰富的渔业资源、大量石油和天然气储量，以及关键的全球贸易路线。
The unfolding public relations battle over the Philippines arbitration case shows that policymakers in Beijing are worried China will look like a rogue international rule-breaker because of its defiance of The Hague tribunal.
围绕菲律宾仲裁案展开的这场公关战显示出，北京的政策制定者担心中国会因藐视海牙法庭而被看作野蛮的国际规则破坏者。
The Philippines contends that China’s claim to “historic rights” over almost the entire South China Sea — based on its “nine-dash line” map — has no basis in international law. Manila also claims large parts of these waters, as does Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam.
菲律宾称中国基于其“九段线”地图对几乎整个南中国海提出的“历史性权利”主张没有任何国际法依据。菲律宾政府也对该海域大片区域提出主张，文莱、马来西亚、台湾和越南也一样。
Although the judges are not considering overt questions of sovereignty, if they rule in the Philippines’ favour on this issue, it would significantly undermine China’s claims.
虽然法官不会考虑主权问题，但如果他们在这件事上的判决倾向菲律宾一方，将对中国的主张造成严重破坏。
The US and the EU, which are concerned about China’s increasingly strident behaviour, have thrown their weight behind Manila, arguing that Beijing should respect the outcome of the case.
美国和欧盟对于中国日益强硬的行为十分关注，它们对菲律宾政府予以支持，认为北京应该尊重裁决结果。
China is lining up its own team of supporters and is neutralising potential opponents with the promise of big infrastructure investments for those who play ball.
中国正在组织自己的支持者队伍，并努力让潜在的反对者中立化，对愿意合作者许以大型基础设施投资的承诺。
Beijing wants to ensure that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the only regional body that regularly discusses security issues, remains divided and weak when it comes to the South China Sea.
北京方面希望确保，唯一定期讨论安全问题的地区组织——东盟(ASEAN)——在面对南中国海问题时仍然维持分裂、软弱的状态。
Regional diplomats fear that it is succeeding.
该地区外交官担心，这一策略正在取得成功。
Mr Wang claimed after the visit to Brunei, Laos and Cambodia that Beijing had reached a “consensus” with these nations to oppose “unilateral” actions, a euphemism for the Philippines case.
在对文莱、老挝、柬埔寨进行访问后，王毅宣称，中国已经与这些国家就反对“单边”行动（对菲律宾行为的委婉说法）达成了“共识”。
Laos and Cambodia, which rely heavily on Chinese investment, have long done Beijing’s bidding by preventing Asean from taking a harder line on the maritime disputes. But oil-rich Brunei, which is feeling the pressure of lower crude prices, has not previously sided so openly with China.
由于严重依赖中国投资，老挝与柬埔寨长期以来一直按照北京方面的吩咐，阻挠东盟在海洋领土争端上采取更强硬的路线。但石油资源丰富的文莱——如今正承受原油价格下跌带来的压力——此前从未如此公开地站在中国一边。
Meanwhile, Southeast Asia’s biggest nation, Indonesia, is trying hard to stay out of the disputes, insisting that a recent clash with China’s coastguard over illegal fishing has nothing to do with China’s geostrategic ambitions.
与此同时，东南亚最大国家印度尼西亚正努力置身这些争端之外。该国坚称，最近围绕非法捕鱼与中国海警发生的一起冲突与中国的地缘政治野心无关。
This is music to Beijing’s ears.
这种表态令北京方面感到悦耳。
Donald Weatherbee, a visiting fellow at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, says that “Indonesia and the other four targets of China’s South China Sea policy are in the same boat, but there is no captain or sailing directions”.
新加坡东南亚研究所(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies)访问研究员唐纳德•韦瑟比(Donald Weatherbee)表示：“印尼与中国南中国海政策其他四个目标国家同坐一条船，但他们没有船长或航行指南。”
Divisions among China’s Southeast Asian neighbours have left the way open for it to alter the “facts on the water” by building military installations from runways to radar stations in the South China Sea.
东南亚邻国间的分歧使中国得以一路畅通地通过在南中国海建立军事设施——从飞机跑道到雷达站——来改变“海上现状”。
Ashley Townshend, a research fellow at the University of Sydney, compares Beijing’s actions to those of a rebel group trying to amass as much bargaining power as possible before being forced eventually to agree a ceasefire.
悉尼大学(University of Sydne)研究员阿什利•汤曾德(Ashley Townshend)将北京方面的行为，比作反叛组织的成员试图在最终被迫同意停火前尽可能多地积累讨价还价的筹码。
The next test of Beijing’s appetite for risk could come at the Scarborough Shoal, which it snatched from Philippines control in 2012. It is rumoured to be the next destination for China’s island-building barges.
对北京方面风险偏好的下一场考验可能来自斯卡伯勒浅滩（Scarborough Shoal，中国称黄岩岛）。中国于2012年从菲律宾夺得了对该岛的控制权。据称，这里将是中国大批造岛驳船的下一个目的地。
If China does try to build up a reef that lies not far from Manila, the US would come under pressure to respond with more freedom of navigation operations or some other show of military force.
如果中国真的试图在这处距马尼拉不远的岛礁填海造岛，美国将面临以更多的航行自由行动或其他展示军事力量的方式进行回应的压力。
But Beijing is hoping it can continue to get away with incrementally changing the status quo and neutralising opposition.
但北京方面正希望能够继续如愿地一边逐步改变现状，一边让反对的国家中立化。
