核泛滥 南亚核武器的建立仍然是恐怖异常

THE militant attack early on August 16th on the Minhas air-force base in Kamra, just 40km (25 miles) outside Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, involved an intense gunfight but was beaten back without much difficulty. Yet probably not before it had rattled nerves in the White House. According to a new book ("Confront and Conceal") by David Sanger of the New York Times, late last year Barack Obama told his staff that his "biggest single national-security concern" was that Pakistan might disintegrate and set off a scramble for its nuclear weapons.

8.16日早晨，仅仅距离巴基斯坦首伊斯兰堡40公里远（25英里）的卡姆拉明罕斯空军基遭到了一次武装袭击，双方发生了激烈的枪战，但是，武装袭击被轻松击退了。然而，可能在此之前这次袭击事件也让白宫紧张了一把。根据一本叫《面对与隐瞒》的新书——作者是纽约时报的大卫桑格---披露：去年末，巴拉克奥巴马曾经告诉他的同僚，当时他最关注的单一国家安全问题——就是巴基斯坦可能会解体，并且会发生争夺核武器的战争。

Inevitably Pakistan denied that Minhas held any of its nuclear warheads, believed to number about 100. In any event the country's security arrangements, it claims, are "perfect". As for the fear of "disintegration", officials are used to pooh-poohing the overheated fears of foreign doom-mongers. Even if bearded fanatics entered the presidential palace and proclaimed a new caliphate, they would dismiss it as a minor upset and offer a cup of tea.

巴基斯坦不出意料地否认说：明罕斯基地没有任何核弹头（据说核弹头数目大概有100枚）。巴方声称，任何有关本国的安全布置都很"完美"。对于"解体"的担心，官方人员总是对国外末世论者的过度担心嗤之以鼻。即使满脸大胡子的狂热分子进入巴总统府，宣布一个新的伊斯兰教国王职权，他们也将会把它视之为一个小小的动乱置之不理，心安理得地喝着茶。

Yet Mr Obama is right to worry that Pakistan's warheads and fissile material could end up in the wrong hands. He should also fret about their future in the "right" hands. Fourteen years after India and Pakistan became declared nuclear powers, the world has become rather blasé about the risks of a subcontinental nuclear confrontation.

然而奥巴马先生担心——巴基斯坦的核弹头和核燃料最终可能落到歹人之手——是有理由的。他也会为这些核弹头和核燃料未来在该掌控它们的人手中而担心。十四年前印度和巴基斯坦宣布自己掌握了核能。而世界对次大陆核对峙的危险越来越不在意。

The history of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal gives at least three reasons for concern. First, no country has such an appalling record as a proliferator of nuclear know-how-and the proliferator-in-chief, A.Q. Khan, remains a national hero. Second, parts of the Pakistani establishment seem to sympathise with militant Islamist movements. It is hard to believe that no senior official or army officer was aware of the late Osama bin Laden's comfortable sojourn in Abbottabad, a stone's throw from an elite military academy. As Mr Sanger reported in an earlier book ("The Inheritance"), in August 2001 a nuclear scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, met bin Laden. Mr Sanger quotes an American spook as saying that Mr Mahmood "was our ultimate nightmare. He had access to the entire Pakistani programme. He knew what he was doing. And he was completely out of his mind."

根据巴基斯坦核军火库的历史，至少有三个理由值得人们担心。首先，没有国家拥有这样让人触目惊心的核专用技术扩散记录---核扩散主管阿卜杜拉-卡迪尔-可汉，到现在对巴基斯坦人来说还是个民族英雄。第二，巴基斯坦建立核武器的部分原因似乎与同情激进的伊斯兰运动有关。一名优秀军事学院的内部人员认为，巴基斯坦国的资深官员或者部队官员不知道奥斯马-本拉登在阿伯塔巴德逗留的最新消息——这一点让人很难相信。就像桑格先生在他早期的书《遗产》中写道的，2001年8月，一名叫苏丹-马哈茂德的核科学家拜会了本拉登。桑格先生引用一个美国间谍的说法，马哈茂德先生是"我们的终极噩梦，他知道巴基斯坦全部的核计划。他知道他在干什么。他简直是疯了。"

Third is the risk of terrorists breaching Pakistan's defences. Al-Qaeda and other militant groups are known to be desperate to get their hands on fissile material or an assembled warhead. As Pakistan is apparently increasing its arsenal as fast as it can and investing in smaller and more easily waylaid weapons, the risks are mounting. This was the fourth attack by extremist groups on Minhas alone. Five other sites linked to the nuclear programme have also been targets.

第三，破坏巴基斯坦防御措施的恐怖分子的威胁。人们知道，基地组织和其他激进组织都不顾一切地想把核燃料或者组装好的核弹头弄到手。很明显，巴基斯坦现在尽它可能地增加它的核武器库，并且在更小规模和更容易伏击的武器上面大量投资。这样的话，风险就会越来越大了。仅在明罕斯，这已经是激进组织发动的第四次袭击了。其它五个与核计划有关的基地也成为了攻击目标。

Pakistan is not at imminent risk of a fundamentalist takeover. But the long-term trends are in the wrong direction. That is why America has given it hundreds of millions of dollars to keep its nuclear weapons safe, even though their very existence is an affront to the non-proliferation doctrine. In an irony typical of the United States-Pakistan "alliance", the chief threat Pakistan now perceives to its arsenal is from America itself. Just after the American raid on Abbottabad in 2011 that killed bin Laden, Pakistan stepped up efforts to secure its nuclear weapons, by dispersing bits of them around the country. One way it does this, apparently, is in unobtrusive civilian vans that can get stuck in traffic.

巴基斯坦现在还没有面临立刻被原教旨主义接管的危险。但是长期发展趋势却已经偏离了正确方向。那也是美国给它数亿美元让它保持核武器安全的原因，即使这些武器的存在已经违反了核武器不扩散原则。在美国-巴基斯坦联盟中，让人感到典型并且充满讽刺的是，现在巴基斯坦认为它的核武器库的主要威胁来自于美国本身。就在2011年，美国突袭阿伯塔巴德杀死本拉登后，巴基斯坦把它的核武器分散到了巴全国，以进一步加强它的核武器的保护能力。其中一种保护方式，就是把核武器藏在那些随时可能会遇到交通堵塞的不显眼民用卡车里，运到目的地。

Perhaps even Pakistani generals accept that this is not an ideal disaster-avoidance plan. Fear of capture or pre-emptive destruction of their nuclear defences seems to be one reason why they are determined to develop a third leg, after air- and land-based delivery systems, to Pakistan's nuclear "triad": nuclear-armed ships and submarines. As Iskander Rehman of the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank, observes in a recent paper, Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry is drifting "from the dusty plains of the Punjab and Rajasthan into the world's most congested shipping lanes." "It is only a matter of time," he argues, "before Pakistan formally brings nuclear weapons into its own fleet."

可能甚至巴基斯坦将军都会承认，这不是一个理想的避免灾难计划。被抓到或者核防御被对方先发制人破坏的担心，似乎解释了为什么他们决定开发空中、陆地运输系统以外的第三个系统——核舰艇和核潜艇，以对付巴基斯坦的核黑社会。就像咨询机构---卡内基国际和平基金会的伊斯坎德尔-拉赫曼在最近报道中观察到的，印巴核竞争已经从尘土飞扬的旁遮普邦及拉贾斯坦邦草原上转移到了世界最拥挤的海上航道上。他认为，"在巴基斯坦正式把核武器纳入其武器系列之前，这只是个时间问题。"

Other reasons for expecting this include a perceived need to match India's own development of sea-based systems, missiles and missile defences, and fear that a future government in Afghanistan might be hostile. Pakistan has always felt the need for "strategic depth" in any conflict with India. In the nuclear age this has meant the ability to scatter defences around its western neighbour. Unlike India, Pakistan has never adopted a "no-first-use" nuclear doctrine. Huge fans of their bombs, Pakistani strategists argue that deterrence works. They point to Pakistan's incursion in Kargil in 1999 and repeated terrorist attacks since then blamed on Pakistan. None provoked full-scale war. Three wars were fought between 1947 and 1971. So this is progress, of a sort.

其他期待的核武器原因，包括：认为要能够与印度人自己开发的海上系统，导弹和导弹防御相抗衡的需要，和对阿富汗未来政府敌意举动的担心。巴基斯坦总是觉得：在任何与印度的冲突中都有战略纵深的需要。在核战争时代，这个意味着，在它西部邻国的周围，巴基斯坦要有分散防御的能力。不像印度，巴基斯坦从未接受过"不首先使用核武器"的核条令。巴基斯坦战略家认为，对热衷于自杀式炸弹的狂热分子们来说，这个还是有一定震慑作用的。他们指出，自从巴基斯坦在1999年侵入克什米尔地区时起，后来多次的恐怖袭击都因此归咎于巴基斯坦。没有人愿意挑起全面战争。1947年到1971年之间只发生了三次战争。所以这也算是一种进步。

Hot finish?

热情似火的结果？

Naval nuclearisation makes this analysis look recklessly complacent. India has been working on "Cold Start", a plan for a blitzkrieg invasion of Pakistan that would not provoke nuclear war. India might think Pakistan is bluffing in its professed willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons against Indian ground troops on Pakistani soil. Weapons at sea could lower the threshold. Pakistan might be less loth to use battlefield nuclear weapons against an aircraft-carrier strike force than soldiers on its own soil.

海军核动力让这种分析看起来就像是坐井观天。印度一直在努力进行一个"冷启动"计划——针对巴基斯坦，不会挑起核战争的闪电侵入计划。印度可能认为--巴基斯坦公开宣称在巴自己的国土上，它可以使用战略核武器来对付印度地面部队--这是在吹牛。海上作战武器要求没有那么高。相比于用战地核武器对付那些士兵。巴基斯坦可能更乐意，在自己的国土上使用战地核武器来对付具有攻击力的航空母舰。

As nukes move to sea, "dual-use" platforms that can be used for both conventional and nuclear weapons create an even more hazardous ambiguity than they do on land. What India sees as a prudent defensive response to China's naval build-up might easily be taken by Pakistan as aggressive. A competitive arms race beckons-with the added twist that the navy, which would be in charge of seaborne nuclear weapons, is thought to be the branch of Pakistan's armed forces most infiltrated by extremists.

当核潜艇驶向海洋时，可以同时用于常规武器和核武器的双重用途平台会产生一种甚至比他们在陆地上使用时，更危险的歧义。印度做出的认为是对中国海军建设的谨慎防御反应可能很容易被巴基斯坦认为其带有侵犯性。加上将配备海上核武器的海军，一个竞争性军备竞赛的潜台词将被认为—这是一支被极端主义者渗透最彻底的巴基斯坦军队的分支。