英国选民应有机会就脱欧改变主意

The Brexit vote has created an environment of great uncertainty for Britain, the EU and the global economy.

英国脱欧公投为英国、欧盟(EU)和全球经济制造了一个巨大的不确定环境。

No one can predict with any confidence what will happen for at least the next three years, but economists are in unusual agreement that if Brexit occurs it will be bad for the UK and bad for the EU.

没有人能有把握地预测至少未来3年内会发生什么，但经济学家不同寻常地达成了共识：如果英国脱欧，将对英国和欧盟不利。

How did we get here? One answer lies in choice architecture, the decision-making framework in which choices are made.

我们如何走到这个境地？一个答案在于选择架构，即做出选择所处的决策框架。

Consider the original charter of the EU.

以欧盟的原始章程为例。

An important principle of good choice architecture is to anticipate how things might go wrong and take steps in advance to mitigate the damage.

良好选择架构的一个重要原则是预测情况可能如何变糟，并提前采取措施减少损害。

In the formation of the EU, this step did not seem to attract the attention it deserved.

在欧盟成立过程中，这一步似乎没有得到足够的关注。

What will happen if a country breaks the rules but is financially unable to repay its debts? The ambiguity in this answer has been evident in the drama surrounding Greece and a possible Grexit.

如果一国违规但没有财力偿还债务会发生什么情况？在围绕希腊和可能的希腊退欧的闹剧中，答案显然相当模糊。

Another question that appears to have been left unanswered originally is what would happen if a country wanted to leave, as the UK might wish to do.

另一个从一开始似乎就没有答案的问题是，如果一国希望离开欧盟会发生什么情况，就像英国可能希望做的那样。

The EU resembled the Hotel California described in the Eagles song, where, You can check out any time you like / But you can never leave.

欧盟就像老鹰乐队(Eagles)所唱的《加州旅馆》(Hotel California)，你可以随时结账，但你永远无法离开。

Eventually this omission was addressed by the creation of the now famous Article 50 of the Lisbon treaty, adopted in 2009, which provides the rules for a country that wishes to secure a divorce from the EU.

最终，如今著名的《里斯本条约》（Lisbon treaty，于2009年生效）第50条的出现解决了这种疏漏，为希望退出欧盟的国家制定了规则。

(It has to be said that few states have provisions for leaving a union to which they belong; the US fought its deadliest war over such an issue.)

（必须承认，几乎没有国家有退出它们所属联盟的规定；美国曾就这个问题进行最惨烈的斗争。）

Although Article 50 was created to determine what happens in the case of a break-up, it is far from a full prenuptial agreement.

尽管第50条的设立是为了确定一国如果要退出欧盟会发生什么，但远非一份完整的婚前协议。

Rather than stating the terms under which a country can leave, it only prescribes a process.

它没有说明一国可以以什么条件退出欧盟，只是规定了程序。

Once a country triggers Article 50, it has two years to negotiate terms and in the event that no agreement is reached (or extension granted), the country is out — and presumably treated like any other country, using the rules established by the World Trade Organisation.

一旦一国触发第50条，它将获得两年的谈判期，一旦没有达成协议（或者获准延期），该国即退出——可能会根据世界贸易组织(WTO)的规定获得与其他任何国家一样的待遇。

Making the rules so vague has had unintended consequences.

制定如此模糊的规则造成了意想不到的后果。

First, it allowed proponents of Brexit to offer voters the apparently unrealistic hope that the UK could negotiate an associate status similar to that of Norway, but with some modifications of the rules on free movement of people.

首先，它让脱欧支持者得以向选民提供明显不切实际的希望：英国可以商议一个与挪威类似的地位，但会略微修改人员自由流动方面的规则。

Second, the rule creates a long period of uncertainty for both the UK and other member states.

其次，这一规则为英国和其他欧盟成员国制造出一种长期不确定性。

The UK could wait a year or more before triggering Article 50, to be followed by what would almost certainly be nearly two years of negotiations.

英国可能要等上一年或更长时间才触发第50条，然后几乎肯定要经历近两年的谈判。

(International negotiations are like home improvement projects: they never finish early.) A better design would have been to spell out the details of a voluntary break-up in advance so any country would have a reasonably solid basis for evaluating the pros and cons of EU membership.

（国际谈判就像家庭装修一样：永远不会提前结束。）一个更好的设计原本可以提前列出自愿退出的细节，这样任何一国都会拥有一个相当坚实的衡量欧盟成员国身份优劣的基础。

It may not be too late to remedy this situation if the EU can figure out a way to clarify the terms of an exit.

如果欧盟能找到明确退出条款的方法，修补这种状况可能还不算太晚。

David Cameron, the former UK prime minister, was responsible for another piece of questionable choice architecture when he promised to hold the EU referendum.

英国前首相戴维•卡梅伦(David Cameron)在承诺举行公投时，要对存在问题的选择架构的另一方面负责。

When should voters be asked their opinion about policy questions? Governments vary greatly on the extent to which they rely on direct democracy rather than a combination of representative government plus bureaucratic agencies, such as central banks.

选民应何时被问到他们对于政策问题的看法？在多大程度上依赖直接民主而非代议制政府和官僚机构（例如央行）的结合体，各地政府的做法大不一样。

As an example, Switzerland and the state of California regularly rely on referendums to make decisions, but the US government never does.

例如，瑞士和美国加州会定期举行公投做出决定，但美国政府从不这样。

When governments have the option to use either method, how should they choose? A good rule of thumb is that the more complicated the decision, the less desirable a referendum.

当政府有使用其中任何一种方法的选择时，他们应如何选择？一条很好的经验是，决定越复杂，公投越不可取。

And it is hard to think of a more complex choice than Europe to put to voters.

很难想象出一个比欧洲更复杂的交给选民决定的选择了。

Furthermore, given the ambiguity of Article 50, voters had no way of knowing what outcomes would come from a vote to Remain or Leave.

另外，鉴于第50条的模糊性，选民无法知道留欧或退欧的公投结果将意味着什么。

Theresa May, now prime minister, made this point before the vote: The reality is that we do not know on what terms we would have access to the single market.

英国新首相特里萨•梅(Theresa May)在公投前就指出：现实是我们不知道我们进入欧洲单一市场的条款会是什么。

But the referendum was held, so the question is what to do now.

但公投已经举行了，因此问题是现在怎么办。

Certainly a majority of just four percentage points in a nonbinding referendum should not be considered a mandate to hastily invoke Article 50.

当然，在一场不具法律约束力的公投中领先区区4个百分点的多数票，不应被视为一项仓促激活第50条的授权。

The vote was more like a straw poll of voter sentiments about a range of issues than a considered evaluation of the costs and benefits of membership of the single market.

这场公投更像是衡量选民对一系列问题看法的民意测验，而不是对欧洲单一市场成员国身份的成本与收益的审慎评估。

Since voters were given a choice that was impossible to evaluate sensibly, they should be given the opportunity to change their mind if the facts change — either via a vote of parliament or a second referendum.

既然选民们是被要求做出不可能理性评估的选择，那么如果事实发生变化，他们应有机会改变心意——要么通过议会投票，要么通过二次公投。

In short, Brexit should not mean (an immediate) Brexit.

简而言之，英国脱欧不应意味着英国（立即）脱欧。