年美国国务卿克林顿在美国和平研究所的讲话
Remarks at the United States Institute of Peace
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
October 21, 2009, Renaissance Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.
重振不扩散体制：美国主导的外交行动
美国国务卿希拉里.克林顿在美国和平研究所的讲话
华盛顿哥伦比亚特区 五月花万丽酒店
2009年10月21日
Good morning. Thank you. Thank you very much.
上午好。谢谢你们。非常感谢你们。
It’s a great honor to be introduced by Ambassador Moose. George and I have had the privilege of working together in the past, and I look forward to his good advice and counsel as we move forward on many of these important matters. I want to thank Ambassador Solomon. Dick has done an extraordinary job, as you all know, both in his prior incarnation with the State Department and now, of course, with the United States Institute of Peace. And Tara, thank you for your leadership and your commitment to these issues.
由穆斯（Moose）大使将我介绍给大家，令我深感荣幸。乔治（George）和我曾有幸共事，我期待着在我们推动诸多重要事务的过程中得到他的指教。我要感谢所罗门（Solomon）大使。迪克（Dick）的工作极为出色，正如你们大家所知，在他过去任职国务院期间及目前在美国和平研究所的工作中都是如此。还有特拉（Tara），感谢你在这些事务中的领导作用和不懈努力。
This is an audience that has many familiar faces in it, people who have been on the frontlines of American foreign policy on conflict resolution and so many specific issues. And I want to particularly just thank two people who have really stepped up to assume new responsibilities on behalf of the Obama Administration, someone who was on the board of USIP, now Under Secretary Maria Otero, and also Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher who — both of whom I’m delighted are part of the team at the State Department. And sitting right there in the front row is one of my role models, Betty Bumpers, who started beating the drums for world peace and for an end to much of the behavior that is so troublesome and threatening between nations. And I am so pleased to see her.
今天在座的有很多熟悉的面孔，你们一直站在美国外交政策的最前沿，致力于解决冲突及许许多多具体问题。我特别要感谢两位代表奥巴马政府切实承担起新责任的人：前任美国和平研究所理事会成员及现任副国务卿玛丽亚?奥特罗（Maria Otero）以及副国务卿埃伦?陶谢尔（Ellen Tauscher）。我非常高兴她们两人都是国务院团队的成员。坐在最前排的是我的一位学习榜样，贝蒂?邦珀斯（Betty Bumpers），你们都知道，她率先为世界和平以及制止国家间令人担忧并构成威胁的种种行为而大声疾呼。我很高兴见到她。
It’s an honor to have been asked to give this second annual Dean Acheson lecture. The Institute has many friends at the State Department and we’re looking forward to the day when we’re not only friends, but neighbors. I know that your new building across the street will allow for even closer cooperation as we work together to build peace and end conflict. I also know that Monday marked your 25th anniversary, and I thank you for the extraordinary work and leadership you’ve provided over the last two and a half decades, including the work you’ve done to review our nuclear posture.
应邀成为第二届年度迪安?艾奇逊演讲的主讲人令我感到荣幸。贵所在国务院有很多朋友，我们期待着不仅是朋友而且是邻居的那一天早日到来。我知道，贵所与国务院隔街相望的新楼将使我们能在共同建设和平与结束冲突的过程中进行更密切的合作。我还知道，本周一是贵所成立25周年纪念日，我感谢你们25年来的卓越努力和领导作用，包括你们为审议我们的核态势所做的工作。The Institute has helped drive the foreign policy debate on nuclear weapons, on conflict prevention and many other critical issues, and you are continuing that essential role. Now, some of you may recall that Secretary Gates’ remarks on this occasion last year when he argued eloquently — and I might add, very convincingly — for providing additional resources to the State Department was a signal event. To have the Secretary of Defense come before a distinguished audience like this and to argue very forcefully on behalf of our civilian capacity is still reverberating throughout Washington.
贵所为推动有关核武器问题、防止冲突问题及其他很多关键性问题的外交政策辩论提供了帮助，而且你们正在继续发挥这种重要作用。在座各位中有人可能记得，国防部长盖茨（Gates）去年在上届演讲中以雄辩的口才指出——我认为也是极有说服力地指出——必须为国务院增拨资源，这是一个具有象征性的表态。国防部长来到与今天类似的由杰出人士组成的听众面前为增强我们这个非军事机构的能力而大声疾呼，这一呼吁至今仍在整个华盛顿引起回响。
In advocating a budget increase for a department other than his own, Secretary Gates said he was returning a favor, because as Secretary of State, Dean Acheson had argued that the United States needed a strong military when cutbacks threatened to gut U.S. forces after the Second World War. Acheson was involved in another vital foreign policy issue where his position transcended bureaucratic allegiances, and his actions provide a useful historical backdrop for my subject today.
盖茨部长在要求为这个并不由他领导的部门增加预算时说，他要还一份人情，因为在二战后的削减措施使美国军队面临被抽去精髓的危险时，时任国务卿的迪安?艾奇逊曾主张美国必须拥有一支强大的军队。在另外一项至关重要的外交政策事务中，艾奇逊所持的立场也超越了山头主义，他所采取的行动为我今天要谈的主题提供了有益的历史背景。
At the close of World War II, Acheson was serving as Under Secretary of State. Secretary of State — or Secretary of War Henry Stimson was the country’s leading advocate for nuclear arms control. But Stimson had a tough opponent in then-Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who wanted to leverage the United States’s nuclear advantage to the maximum extent possible. Acheson looked beyond the confines of his bureaucracy and joined with the Secretary of War in favor of arms control. He recognized that the world was at a crossroads. And he saw that the United States had an obligation and an interest in working with other nations to curb the spread of the most dangerous weapons in history.
在二战接近尾声时，艾奇逊担任副国务卿。担任国务卿——我是说战争部长（Secretary of War）——的史汀生（Henry Stimson）是美国主张控制核军备的先锋， 但他的主张遭到了时任国务卿的詹姆斯?贝尔纳斯（James F. Byrnes）的坚决反对，因为贝尔纳斯想要最大限度地利用美国的核优势。艾奇逊没有局限于他所在的部门，而是与战争部长共同主张实行军备控制。他认识到世界当时正处在一个十字路口，他认为美国出于义务和利益应当同其他国家一道遏制有史以来最危险的武器的扩散。
Well, today, we find ourselves at yet another crossroads. During the Cold War, we feared an all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. And in October 1962, the world came close. But President Kennedy realized that a nuclear war was profoundly unwinnable. And over time, he and successive administrations took steps to mitigate that risk and curtail the spread of nuclear weapons.
今天，我们处于又一个十字路口。冷战期间，我们担心在美国与苏联之间爆发一场全面核战争。1962年10月，世界就曾濒临这样一场战争的边缘。但是，肯尼迪（Kennedy）总统认识到，在一场核战争中根本不可能有胜利者。随着时间的推移，他和其后历届政府都采取步骤降低这种风险，阻遏核武器的扩散。
We now face a different kind of threat, a threat that is more diffuse and perhaps even more dangerous. The range and intensity of current nuclear proliferation challenges is alarming. The international community failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. We are now engaged in diplomatic efforts to roll back this development. Iran continues to ignore resolutions from the United Nations Security Council demanding that it suspend its enrichment activities and live up to those international obligations.
我们今天面临着一种不同的威胁，这一威胁的范围更广，危险性可能更大。当前核扩散问题发展到了令人担心的范围和程度。国际社会未能制止北韩发展核武器。我们目前正为扭转这一变化而进行外交努力。伊朗继续无视联合国安理会要求其停止铀浓缩活动、履行其国际义务的各项决议。
The International Atomic Energy Agency doesn’t have the tools or authority to carry out its mission effectively. We saw this in the institution’s failure to detect Iran’s covert enrichment plant and Syria’s reactor project. Illicit state and non-state proliferation networks are engaging in sensitive nuclear trade and circumventing laws designed to protect us against the export and import of nuclear materials.
国际原子能机构缺乏有效执行其使命的手段或权威。我们可以从该机构未能发现伊朗的秘密浓缩铀工厂和叙利亚的核反应堆项目这样的事实中看到这一点。非法的国家和非国家扩散网正在进行敏感的核交易，规避旨在制止核材料进出口以保护我们的相关法律。Working through Senator Lugar’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we have deactivated or destroyed thousands of nuclear weapons. But vast stocks of potentially dangerous nuclear materials remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. With growing global energy needs and the threat of climate change, the demand for nuclear power is expanding, and we do need to continue to facilitate the legitimate peaceful use of nuclear energy. Yet, this expansion has not been accompanied by corresponding measures that could reduce the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation.
通过参议员卢格（Lugar）提出的《减少威胁合作计划》，我们使数以千计的核武器退役或予以销毁，但大量有潜在危险的核材料依然有可能被偷窃或被转用。随着全球能源需求的增长和气候变化的威胁，对核电的需求也不断扩大，因此我们确实需要继续促进核能的合法与和平利用。然而，在核电扩大使用的同时，并没有相应的措施来降低核武器扩散的危险。
We also know that unless these trends are reversed, and reversed soon, we will find ourselves in a world with a steadily growing number of nuclear-armed states, and increasing likelihood of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons.
我们还知道，除非扭转这些趋势，而且迅速扭转，我们将会置身于一个有核国家数量不断增加、恐怖分子染指核武器可能性日益增大的世界。
President Obama recognizes this danger. In April, in Prague, he presented the United States’ vision for how to meet these challenges. He reinforced the core bargain of the global nonproliferation regime, calling on all states to live up to their responsibilities and put down a marker for every nation when he called for a world free of nuclear weapons. And last month, when President Obama became the first United States President to chair a session of the United Nations Security Council, he presided over the unanimous passage of a resolution that set forth a robust nonproliferation and arms control agenda.
奥巴马总统认识到这一危险。今年4月，他在布拉格提出了美国关于如何应对这些挑战的设想。他在呼吁建立一个无核世界时，充实了全球防扩散体制的核心条件，要求所有国家履行自己的责任，也提出了每一个国家都不应当逾越的界线。上个月，奥巴马总统成为主持联合国安理会会议的首位美国总统。在他的主持下，会议一致通过决议，制定了一个内容充实的防扩散和军备控制议程。
Pursuing these goals is not an act of starry-eyed idealism or blind allegiance to principle. It is about taking responsibility to prevent the use of the world’s most dangerous weapons, and holding others accountable as well. The policies that take us there must be up to the task: tough, smart, and driven by the core interests of the United States. As the President has acknowledged, we might not achieve the ambition of a world without nuclear weapons in our lifetime or successive lifetimes. But we believe that pursuing this vision will enhance our national security and international stability.
寻求这些目标并非某种不切实际的理想主义行为或拘泥于原则，而是关系到承担防止使用世界上最危险武器的责任，同时也要求其他国家承担责任。为实现我们的目标而制定的政策必须不辜负这项使命：有力、明智、符合美国的核心利益。如同总统所承认，在我们这一代或未来若干代时间内，我们也许无法实现无核世界的宏伟目标。但我们相信，追求这一愿景将增强我国的安全与国际稳定。
We also believe that the United States must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies and partners while we pursue our vision.
我们还相信，在追求这一愿景的同时，美国必须保持一个安全、有效的核武库，以阻遏任何敌人，保卫我们的盟友和伙伴。
All countries have an obligation to help address the challenges posed by nuclear weapons, beginning with the nuclear weapons states. As the permanent members of the Security Council and the only nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT, we all have a responsibility to stop the erosion of the nonproliferation regime and to address the current crisis of compliance in which some countries apparently feel they can violate their obligations and defy the Security Council with impunity.
世界各国都有义务为应对核武器构成的挑战作出贡献，这首先要从有核国家做起。作为安理会常任理事国以及《不扩散核武器条约》承认的核武器国，我们都有责任遏制对不扩散体制的侵蚀，并消除在条约执行方面存在的危机，一些国家显然认为它们可以违背其义务，蔑视安理会，而不受惩罚。The non-nuclear weapon states also have a responsibility to work to prevent further proliferation. That responsibility does not end with their decision to forgo their own weapons ambitions and accept safeguards to demonstrate the sincerity of that decision. It must continue with active participation in resolute efforts to impede additional countries from crossing the nuclear threshold, because their own security and well-being are profoundly affected by the outcome of such efforts.
无核国家也有责任为防止进一步的扩散而进行努力。这一责任不仅限于决定放弃寻求核武器并接受保障体制以就该决定表示出诚意，还必须体现于继续积极参与，作出果断努力，阻止更多国家突破核门槛， 因为它们自身的安全和利益将深受这些努力结果的影响。所有核材料或核技术拥有国都有责任防止它们被偷盗或被非法转运。
All states with nuclear materials or technology have a responsibility to protect them against theft or illicit transfer. Now if all countries step up to these responsibilities, as we are doing, we can revitalize the nonproliferation regime for decades to come. The cornerstone of that regime, the NPT, remains sound and need not be altered. But as we have done for 40 years, we must build on that essential foundation by supplementing the treaty and updating the overall regime with measures designed to confront emerging challenges.
如果所有国家像我们一样加快步伐履行这些责任，我们就能在今后数十年重振不扩散体制。该体制的基石——即《不扩散核武器条约》——依然是健全的，并不需要改变。然而，正如我们过去40年来所做的那样，我们必须加强这一关键性基础，完善条约，全面更新体制，采取旨在应对新挑战的措施。
The Administration’s blueprint for our efforts is based on the hard, day-to-day work of active diplomacy — confronting proliferators, strengthening the capabilities of the IAEA and ensuring that all nations abide by the rights and obligations of the nonproliferation regime, negotiating a new treaty with Russia to reduce our nuclear arsenal, seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and prompt negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, undertaking a review of the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’s defense strategy, and supporting budgetary priorities that guarantee the safety and effectiveness of our deterrent.
本届政府为我们的行动所制定的蓝图系基于积极的日常外交努力；勇敢地面对扩散者；加强国际原子能机构的能力，确保所有国家遵循不扩散体制规定的权利与义务；与俄罗斯谈判新协议以减少我们的核库存；寻求批准《全面禁止核试验条约》，并立即开始谈判《裂变材料禁产条约》；对核武器在美国防御战略中的作用进行审议；支持那些确保我们威慑力的安全及有效性的重点预算项目。
Now, I am well aware of the difficult road ahead to uphold the NPT, restore the international nonproliferation consensus, and reinvigorate the global nonproliferation regime. Progress will not be easy. At times, our achievements may [seem] incomplete and unsatisfying, but we are committed to seeing this through, and we believe the world is depending on our success. The reality is that the nuclear threat cannot be checked by us acting alone. Whether we seek to prevent the smuggling of dangerous nuclear materials, establish a new international framework for civil nuclear energy cooperation, increase the IAEA’s budget, or persuade governments with nuclear weapons ambitions to abandon their quest, we can only achieve our goals through cooperation with others. In recent years, however, polarization within the international community on proliferation issues between states with nuclear weapons and those without have created obstacles to the cooperation that is needed.
我非常清楚，要维持《不扩散核武器条约》，恢复国际不扩散共识以及重振全球不扩散体制，未来的道路是艰难的。进展将不会一帆风顺。有时，我们的成就可能看似不彻底、不能令人满意。然而， 我们有决心完成这项事业。我们认为世界有赖于我们的成功。现实情况是，仅靠我们单独行动是不能遏制核威胁的。无论是防止危险的核材料的偷运，建立新的民用核能合作的国际框架，增加国际原子能机构的预算，还是说服有核武器企图的政府放弃其计划，我们只有通过与别国合作才能实现我们的目标。然而，近年来国际社会在扩散问题上出现了两极分化，有核国家与无核国家之间的分歧为必要的合作带来障碍。
Overcoming these obstacles must start from the premise that the nuclear threat is a danger that all nations face together, and that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is not just in the interests of the existing nuclear weapon states, as it is sometimes asserted. Indeed, the non-nuclear weapon states have as much or more to lose if these weapons spread or are ever used again. The same logic applies to our work to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. A nuclear terrorist bomb detonated anywhere in the world would have vast economic, political, ecological and social consequences everywhere in the world.
要克服这些障碍，就必须接受一个前提：核威胁是所有国家共同面对的危险；防止核武器扩散并不像有些人所说的那样仅仅符合有核国家的利益。的确，如果这些武器得以扩散或再度使用，那么无核国家会遭受同样甚至更大的损失。我们抗击核恐怖主义威胁的工作也是如此。在世界上任何地方引爆恐怖主义核弹均会给全球带来巨大的经济、政治、生态乃至社会后果。It’s easy to advocate a go-it-alone approach that ignores the cooperation needed to address universal challenges. But we have seen the failed results of this approach. The more difficult, but more productive path is to engage our allies and partners around the world in that hard work of diplomacy. Because as President Obama has said, we must pursue a path that is grounded in the rights and responsibilities of all nations. We must continue to strengthen each of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of global nonproliferation — preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament, and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy. And to those three pillars, we should add a fourth: preventing nuclear terrorism. Stopping terrorists from acquiring the ultimate weapon was not a central preoccupation when the NPT was negotiated, but today, it is, and it must remain at the top of our national security priorities.
忽视应对全世界面临的挑战所必需的合作、提倡单独行动的做法是容易的，但我们已看到这一做法所导致的失败结果。更艰难但却更富有成效的道路是，促使我们在世界各地的盟国及合作伙伴参与这一艰巨的外交工作，因为正如奥巴马总统所言，我们必须寻求一条基于所有国家的权利与义务的道路。我们必须继续加强全球不扩散相辅相成的三大要素：防范核武器扩散、推动裁军进程和便利和平使用核能。在这三者基础之上，我们还应增加第个四要素：防范核恐怖主义。在谈判《不扩散核武器条约》时，防范恐怖分子获取这一终极武器尚不是一个核心议题，但今天它是。它必须是我们国家安全的首要议程。
As we advance this agenda, we can reduce the size and scope of the proliferation threat to our nation, our children, and future generations. The U.S.-led diplomatic campaign began with countering immediate proliferation threats, and will seek over time to improve verification, stiffen penalties, disrupt illicit proliferation networks, reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, and allow nations to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear power, while deploying safeguards against proliferation.
在我们推进这项议程时，我们能够缩小扩散对我国和我们的子孙后代构成威胁的规模和范围。美国领导的外交行动首先要反击扩散的直接威胁。今后，我们将努力改进核查、加重惩处措施、捣毁非法扩散网络、减少核恐怖主义威胁，并在采取保障措施防扩散的同时使各国能够享受和平使用核能带来的好处。
Thwarting the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran is critical to shoring up the nonproliferation regime. Within the framework of the six-party talks, we are prepared to meet bilaterally with North Korea, but North Korea’s return to the negotiating table is not enough. Current sanctions will not be relaxed until Pyongyang takes verifiable, irreversible steps toward complete denuclearization. Its leaders should be under no illusion that the United States will ever have normal, sanctions-free relations with a nuclear armed North Korea.
挫败北韩和伊朗发展核武器的野心对加强不扩散体制至关重要。我们在六方会谈的框架内准备与北韩举行双边会谈。但是北韩仅仅回到谈判桌前还不够。在平壤向全面去核化迈出可核查、不可逆转的步骤之前，我们不会放松目前的制裁。北韩领导人不应幻想美国会与一个拥有核武器的北韩建立正常关系并取消制裁。
Together with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, the United States is pursuing a dual-track approach toward Iran. If Iran is serious about taking practical steps to address the international community’s deep concerns about its nuclear program, we will continue to engage both multilaterally and bilaterally to discuss the full range of issues that have divided Iran and the United States for too long. The door is open to a better future for Iran, but the process of engagement cannot be open-ended. We are not prepared to talk just for the sake of talking.
美国与其他联合国安理会常任理事国及德国一起对伊朗实行双轨做法。如果伊朗确实打算基于国际社会对其核项目的深切关注采取切实措施，我们将继续与伊朗进行多边和双边接触，商讨长期以来造成伊朗和美国之间分歧的全部议题。通向更美好未来的大门对伊朗敞开着。但是接触的进程不可能是无限期的。我们不准备仅仅为谈判而谈判。
As President Obama noted after the October 1st meeting in Geneva, we appear to have made a constructive beginning, but that needs to be followed up by constructive actions. In particular, prompt action is needed on implementing the plan to use Iran’s own low-enriched uranium to refuel the Tehran research reactor, which is used to produce medical isotopes.
正如奥巴马总统10月1日在日内瓦会谈后所指出的，我们看来有了一个建设性开端，但接下来必须有建设性行动。尤其必须立即采取行动，执行有关用伊朗自己提炼的低浓度浓缩铀为德黑兰作研究用的反应堆提供燃料的计划——该反应堆用于生产医用同位素。
Enhancing the IAEA’s capabilities to verify whether states are engaging in illicit nuclear activity is essential to strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The IAEA’s additional protocol, which allows for more aggressive, short-notice inspections should be made universal, through concerted efforts to persuade key holdout states to join.
加强提高国际原子能机构核查有关国家是否在从事非法核活动的能力对加强不扩散体制至为关键。国际原子能机构的附加议定书——它允许进行更严格的突击检查——应当通过共同协调的努力使之在世界通用，以说服拒不参加的主要国家加入其中。
Our experience with Iraq’s nuclear program before the 1991 Gulf War showed that the IAEA’s rights and resources needed upgrading. The additional protocol is the embodiment of those lessons. A failure to make this protocol the global standard means the world will have failed to heed the lessons of history at our collective peril. The IAEA should make full use of existing verification authorities, including special inspections. But it should also be given new authorities, including the ability to investigate suspected nuclear weapons-related activities even when no nuclear materials are present. And if we expect the IAEA to be a bulwark of the nonproliferation regime, we must give it the resources necessary to do the job.
我们在1991年海湾战争前在伊拉克核项目方面的经验教训说明，需要提升国际原子能机构的权力并增加它的资源。附加议定书是汲取这些教训的体现。如不使此议定书成为全球通行的标准，则意味着世界未能吸取历史教训，其后果将危害我们所有人。国际原子能机构应当充分利用现有核查授权，包括进行特别核查的授权。但也应当授予它新的权力，包括即使在没有当场发现核材料的情况下也能调查与核武器相关的嫌疑活动。如果我们期望国际原子能机构成为不扩散体制的一个堡垒，我们就必须让它获得做好这项工作的必要资源。Improving the IAEA’s ability to detect safeguard violations is not enough. Potential violators must know that if they are caught, they will pay a high price. That is certainly not the case today. Despite American efforts, the international community’s record of enforcing compliance in recent years is unacceptable. Compliance mechanisms and procedures must be improved. We should consider adopting automatic penalties for violation of safeguards agreements; for example, suspending all international nuclear cooperation, or IAEA technical cooperation projects until compliance has been restored.
仅仅提高国际原子能机构核查违反保障机制做法的能力还不够。试图违规的国家必须清楚，它们一旦被发现，将付出高昂的代价。但今天的情况显然不是这样。尽管有美国的努力，但近几年来国际社会确保执行保障机制的记录仍是不能接受的。对遵守机制与程序必须作出改进。针对违反保障机制协议的行为，我们应该考虑采用自动惩罚措施。例如，中断所有的国际核合作或国际原子能机构技术合作项目，直至恢复遵守协议为止。
And because the role of the Security Council is so important on compliance issues, we are working to rebuild the consensus among the five permanent members on NPT enforcement.
鉴于安理会在遵守协议问题上的作用如此重要，我们正在努力在五个常任理事国中就执行《不扩散核武器条约》问题重新建立共识。
We must also use financial and legal tools to better disrupt illicit proliferation networks. This will mean tightening controls on transshipment, a key source of illicit trade, and strengthening Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology. A reinvigorated nonproliferation regime should enable countries, especially developing countries, to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, while providing incentives for them not to build their own enrichment or reprocessing facilities. These facilities are inherently capable of producing both fuel for nuclear reactors and the fissile cores of nuclear weapons and should not be allowed to proliferate.
我们还须运用金融和法律手段，更有效地瓦解从事扩散的非法网络。这将意味着更严格地控制转运——这是非法贸易的重要来源，并加强核供应国集团（Nuclear Suppliers Group）对浓缩与再加工技术转让的限制。一个更有力的不扩散体制应该使各国——尤其是发展中国家——能够享受和平利用核能的好处，同时为它们带来不建造自身铀浓缩与再加工设施的种种好处。这些设施的性质注定它们既能生产核反应堆燃料，也能生产核武裂变材料，因此不应增多。
But we need to ensure that states have access to nuclear fuel, a right guaranteed under the NPT. The best way to accomplish this goal is by expanding fuel cycle options. Multilateral fuel supply assurances, international fuel banks, and spent fuel repositories can enhance the confidence of states embarking on or expanding their nuclear power programs. These initiatives will encourage countries to pursue legitimate civil nuclear plans without assuming the risk and expense of constructing their own fuel cycle facilities. So we will support international fuel banks and effective fuel service arrangements as key components of our nonproliferation policy.
但我们需要确保各个国家都可以获得核燃料，这是《不扩散核武器条约》予以保证的权利。实现这个目标的最好办法是扩大燃料循环的各种途径。多边的燃料供应保证、国际燃料库和废燃料储存库能增强正在开展或扩大核电力项目国家的信心。这些积极措施将鼓励各国实施合理的民用核计划，而不必承担建造自身燃料循环设施的风险与费用。因此，我们将把支持国际燃料库和有效的燃料服务安排作为我们不扩散政策的重要内容。
Now, we cannot divorce nonproliferation efforts from the challenge of reducing existing nuclear arsenals, both are part of the core bargain of the NPT. All countries face a common danger from nuclear weapons, but the nuclear arms states, and especially the United States and Russia, have an obligation to reduce their weapons stockpiles. And the Obama Administration is actively pursuing these steps. We are negotiating an agreement with the Russians that will succeed the soon-to-expire START treaty, and significantly reduce the nuclear forces of both sides. It will also set the stage for even deeper cuts in the future.
然而，我们无法把不扩散的努力与减少现有核武库的挑战截然分开。两者都是《不扩散核武器条约》的重要条件。所有国家都面临来自核武器的共同危险，但有核国家——尤其是美国和俄罗斯——有责任减少各自的武器库存，而奥巴马政府正在积极采取这些步骤。我们正在与俄罗斯方面谈判一项协议，接替即将到期的《削减战略武器条约》（START Treaty），并大幅度削减双方的核军备。它也将为今后作出更大削减创造条件。
Let me be clear: the United States is interested in a new START agreement because it will bolster our national security. We and Russia deploy far more nuclear weapons than we need or could ever potentially use without destroying our ways of life. We can reduce our stockpiles of nuclear weapons without posing any risk to our homeland, our deployed troops or our allies.
我要明确表示，美国有意在《削减战略武器条约》后达成一项新协议是因为它将增强国家安全。我们和俄罗斯部署的核武器远远超过了我们的需要，远远超过万一动用而又不给我们的生活方式造成毁灭的程度。我们能够做到在不给国土、驻军和盟国构成危险的同时，减少核库存。So in addition to supporting a robust nuclear complex budget in 2011, we will also support a new Stockpile Management Program that would focus on sustaining capabilities. This is what the military leaders, charged with responsibility for our strategic deterrent, need in order to defend our country. General Chilton, Commander of U.S. STRATCOM, has said repeatedly that he doesn’t need new nuclear weapons capabilities — but he must be confident in the capabilities that we have.
因此，我们除了支持一个强有力的2011年核设施预算案外，还要支持建立一个致力于维持相关能力的新的核武库管理项目。这是肩负战略威慑职责的军事领袖们保家卫国的需要。美国战略司令部（STRATCOM）指挥官奇尔顿（Chilton）上将曾不止一次地表示，他并不需要新的核武器能力，但是必须对我们已拥有的能力有信心。
As we establish that confidence through Stockpile Management, we are making preparations for securing Senate approval for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and working globally to convince other hold-out states to bring that treaty into force. Bringing the treaty into force will strengthen and reenergize the global nonproliferation regime and, in doing so, enhance our own security.
我们正通过库存管理建立这样的信心，与此同时，我们还为争取参议院批准《全面禁止核试验条约》做准备，并在全球范围内积极劝说其他尚未签署的国家促使这项条约生效。这项条约生效有助于全球不扩散体制得到加强并焕发新的活力，从而增强我们本身的安全。
For almost two decades, and over four successive administrations, the United States has observed a moratorium on nuclear testing. So we are already honoring the fundamental obligation of the treaty. A test ban treaty that has entered into force will allow the United States and others to challenge states engaged in suspicious testing activities — including the option of calling on-site inspections to be sure that no testing occurs anywhere. CTBT ratification would also encourage the international community to move forward with other essential nonproliferation steps. And make no mistake, other states — rightly or wrongly — view American ratification of the CTBT as a sign of our commitment to the nonproliferation consensus.
近20年以来，经过连续4届政府，美国始终坚持不进行核试验。因此，我们已经承担了条约的基本义务。禁止核试验条约生效有利于美国及有关方面对从事可疑的核试验活动的国家采取反制措施——包括要求进行现场核查，以保证任何地方都不发生核试验活动。批准《全面禁止核试验条约》还可促使国际社会进而采取其他重要的不扩散行动。毫无疑问，其他国家——无论如何——都会认为美国批准《全面禁止核试验条约》是我们坚持不扩散共识的一个标志。
In coming months, several important events can accelerate progress on our nonproliferation and arms control agenda. In April, President Obama will host a global summit on nuclear security, an unprecedented gathering that will help promote a common understanding of the threat of nuclear terrorism and build international support for effective means of countering that threat. The following month, the NPT Review Conference, held every five years, will seek a consensus among NPT parties on a program of work for strengthening the NPT regime. We hope that these meetings will provide a launching pad for our global efforts to address this challenge.
今后几个月，几项重大的活动有助于我们的不扩散和军备控制议程加速取得进展。4月，奥巴马总统将主持全球核安全峰会（Global Summit on Nuclear Security）。 这个前所未有的重要活动有助于增进人们对核恐怖主义威胁的共同认识，同时为采取有效措施抗击这项威胁争取国际社会的支持。此后一个月，每5年举行一次的《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会（NPT Review Conference）将寻求《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国为加强核不扩散体制的工作纲领取得共识。我们希望上述会议为我们应对这个挑战的全球行动提供一个启动平台。
The nuclear threats facing the international community today cannot be overstated. They pose a grave challenge. And as with other global threats, most notably climate change, we are all in the same boat. Unless we act decisively and act now, the situation may deteriorate catastrophically and irreversibly.
国际社会今天面临的核威胁构成了一项严峻的挑战，其严重性不容忽视。与我们面对的其他全球性挑战一样——其中最值得关注的是气候变化问题——大家都在同一条船上。如果我们不采取果断行动，不立即采取行动，形势就可能继续恶化并导致灾难性的后果，造成无法挽回的局面。
Some experts looking at current nuclear threats and the pressures bearing down on the global nonproliferation regime have come to pessimistic conclusions about our nuclear future. They talk about nuclear cascades and terrorists getting their hands on the bomb. According to them, future proliferation is inevitable; stopping it is futile.
目睹当前核威胁以及全球不扩散体制承受的压力，一些专家对我们的核未来得出了悲观的结论。他们谈论核级联（nuclear cascades），声称恐怖分子将掌控核武器。他们认为，未来核扩散是不可避免的，阻止该趋势的努力将是徒劳的。
Further proliferation and nuclear terrorism are not foregone conclusions. These dangers can be impeded and even prevented. But countering these threats requires us to realize that all states have a common interest in reinvigorating the nonproliferation regime — and that all states bear a responsibility in advancing that effort.
进一步扩散与核恐怖主义不是注定要发生的事情。这些危险能够予以抗击甚或消除。但是，要抗击这些威胁，我们必须认识到，在加强不扩散体制方面，所有国家有着共同的利益，所有国家都必须为推动这项努力而承担责任。
Dean Acheson recognized these truths in his day. They have not dimmed with the passage of time. And the United States will do all it can to carry on this work, and ensure that our efforts succeed.
迪安?艾奇逊在他那个时代就认识到这些真理，它们并没有随着时间的推移而褪色。美国将竭尽全力继续这项工作，确保我们的努力获得成功。
As we stand at this new crossroads our path forward is clear. It is a path that leads from the streets of Prague, through the milestones I’ve spoken of today, and eventually, some day, to a world without nuclear weapons.
今天，我们站在这个新的十字路口，我们的前进道路是明确的。这条道路以布拉格的街道为起点，经过我今天讲到的那些里程碑，最终有一天将到达一个没有核武器的世界。
Just as Acheson did in his time, we must meet this challenge by acting boldly, wisely, hopefully, and in concert with other nations. And once again, if we do so, American leadership will ensure our security and the peace of future generations.
正如艾奇逊在他那个时代所做的那样，我们必须勇敢、明智、充满希望地与其他国家一道迎接这一挑战。如果我们这样做，美国将再次发挥领导作用，确保我们这一代人的安全以及子孙后代的和平。
Thank you all very much.
非常感谢大家。
继续保持超出我们安全所需的核武器不会让美国更安全。目前的核局面既不可取，也无法持续。它使其他国家有动机、有借口发展它们各自的核方案。
The right way to reduce our excess nuclear forces is in parallel with Russia. Verifiable mutual reductions through a new START treaty will help us build trust and avoid surprises. We are working hard to ensure that the new agreement will continue to allow for inspections and other mechanisms that allow us to build confidence. We are under no illusions that the START agreement will persuade Iran and North Korea to end their illicit nuclear activities. But it will demonstrate that the United States is living up to its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligation to work toward nuclear disarmament. In doing so, it will help convince the rest of the international community to strengthen nonproliferation controls and tighten the screws on states that flout that their nonproliferation commitments.
减少我们过剩核力量的正确途径是与俄罗斯齐头并进。通过一项新的削减战略武器条约实现可核查的共同削减将有助于我们建立信任，避免意外。我们正在作出积极努力，确保新协议将继续包含能够让我们建立信心的检查和其他机制。我们绝不幻想新的削减战略武器条约会说服伊朗和北韩结束它们的非法核活动。但是，它将表明美国奉行《不扩散核武器条约》的义务，在为核裁军作出努力。这样做也将有助于说服国际社会其他成员加强不扩散控制，对那些无视其不扩散承诺的国家给与更有力的钳制。
For the same reason, the United States seeks to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty with appropriate monitoring and verification provisions. A universal FMCT will halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, capping the size of existing arsenals, and reducing the risk that terrorist groups will one day gain access to stockpiles of fissile materials.
基于同样的原因，美国在争取尽快就制定一项含有相应监督与核查条款的《裂变材料禁产条约》展开谈判。一项全球性裂变材料禁产条约将制止武器级钚和高浓铀的生产，限制现存核武规模，减少恐怖主义组织未来获取裂变材料的危险。
But we must do more than reduce the numbers of our nuclear weapons. We must also reduce the role they play in our security. In this regard, the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review will be a key milestone. It will more accurately calibrate the role, size, and composition of our nuclear stockpile to the current and future international threat environments. And it will provide a fundamental reassessment of U.S. nuclear force posture, levels, and doctrine. Carried out in consultation with our allies, it will examine the role of nuclear weapons in deterring today’s threats and review our declaratory policies with respect to the circumstances in which the United States would consider using nuclear weapons.
但是，我们所必须做的不仅仅是减少我们的核武器数量。我们还必须降低核武器在保障我们的安全中的作用。在这方面，持续进行的《和态势评估报告》（Nuclear Posture Review）将成为重要的里程碑。它将根据当前和未来国际环境中存在的威胁，更准确地调整我们核库存的作用、规模和结构，对美国核武力势态（U.S. Nuclear Force Posture）的级别和方针提出根本性再评估。这项报告将结合与盟国的磋商，检视核武器在今天的威慑作用，审视涉及美国在何种情况下考虑动用核武器的核威慑政策。
As part of the NPR, the Nuclear Posture Review, we are grappling with key questions: What is the fundamental purpose of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal? Will our deterrence posture help the United States encourage others to reduce their arsenals and advance our nonproliferation agenda? How can we provide reassurance to our allies in a manner that reinforces our nonproliferation objectives?
在《核态势评估报告》中，我们将努力回答一些关键问题。美国核武库的根本目的是什么？我们的威慑姿态是否将有助于美国鼓励其他国家减少它们的库存和推动我们的核不扩散议程？我们将如何能够为盟国提供保障而同时推进我们的核不扩散目标？
We believe now is the time for a look — a fresh look at the views on the role of the United States nuclear weapons arsenal. We can’t afford to continue relying on recycled Cold War thinking. We are sincere in our pursuit of a secure peaceful world without nuclear weapons. But until we reach that point of the horizon where the last nuclear weapon has been eliminated, we need to reinforce the domestic consensus that America will maintain the nuclear infrastructure needed to sustain a safe and effective deterrent without nuclear testing.
我们认为，现在应该是对美国核军备的作用作出重新审视的时侯了。我们不能继续依靠翻新的冷战思维。我们真诚追求一个没有核武器的安全、和平的世界。但在达到最后一枚核武器被消除的那一远景目标之前，我们需要强调这样一个内部共识，即美国将为保持一种没有核试验的安全、有效的威慑力而维持必需的核基础设施。
