双方对抗将使俄罗斯与西方双输

Western suspicions that Russia is following the “Crimea playbook” in eastern Ukraine are way off the mark. To begin with, President Vladimir Putin never considered Crimea to be part of Ukraine. His mission there, as he saw it, was to reunify Russia and correct two historical injustices: Nikita Khrushchev’s transfer of the peninsula to Ukraine from Russia in 1954; and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, which left Crimea in now independent Ukraine. That mission is now accomplished.

西方怀疑俄罗斯正在乌克兰东部沿用“克里米亚策略”，这种怀疑远不是事实。首先，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)从来没把克里米亚视为乌克兰的一部分。他认为，他在该地区的使命是重新统一俄罗斯，并纠正两个历史性错误：一是1954年尼基塔•赫鲁晓夫(Nikita Khrushchev)将克里米亚半岛从俄罗斯划归乌克兰，二是1991年苏联解体——这导致克里米亚留在如今独立的乌克兰手中。现在，他的这一使命已经完成。

Eastern and southern Ukraine are different. Ethnic Russians are not in a majority there, and the sense of allegiance and attachment to the Russian state – which was so strong in, say, Sevastopol – is totally missing. And whereas the Black Sea Fleet was on hand in Crimea, there are no Russian forces stationed in eastern Ukraine. To understand Mr Putin’s motives, you have to see the world through his eyes. For the Russian president, civilisations are the main units of global politics. Sometimes they align and sometimes they clash. For him, the Russian state is inextricably entwined with Russian civilisation. And he sees Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians as one people.

乌克兰东部与南部不同。俄罗斯人在当地不占多数，那里完全没有对俄罗斯政府的拥护感和归属感——而这种感觉在塞瓦斯托波尔之类的城市（塞瓦斯托波尔位于克里米亚，是俄罗斯黑海舰队总部所在地——译者注）是如此强烈。而且与黑海舰队随时驻扎在克里米亚不同，乌克兰东部并未驻扎俄罗斯军队。要理解普京的动机，必须站在他的角度看待这个世界。对这位俄罗斯总统来说，文明才是全球政治的主要单位。各种文明间有时候会结盟，有时候会发生冲突。对他来说，俄罗斯政府与俄罗斯文明之间有着密不可分的关系。此外，他还把俄罗斯人、白俄罗斯人和乌克兰人视为一家人。

A century ago, this was the official view in St Petersburg. For Mr Putin, the natural line between the Russian civilisation and that of western Europe runs along the western borders of Belarus and the Russian Federation itself. Ukraine, however, is a cleft country, torn between Russia and Europe. It can be partitioned or, better, neutralised – becoming either a buffer or a bridge between Russian and the west.

一个世纪以前，这正是圣彼得堡（沙皇俄国的首都——译者注）的官方看法。对普京来说，俄罗斯文明与西欧文明间的天然界线，是白俄罗斯和俄罗斯联邦的西部边界组成的这条线。而乌克兰却是一个“裂缝国家”，俄罗斯文明和欧洲文明将该国分成了两半。出于这个原因，乌克兰可能呈现分裂状态，或者更好的情况是该国会走向中立，成为俄罗斯和西方之间的缓冲地带或沟通桥梁。

The US sees the world through a similar lens. In its eyes, allowing Kiev to fall into Moscow’s orbit would mean a resurgence of the Russian empire. A western-leaning and economically successful Ukraine would deny Moscow its historical domain and undermine the Russian autocracy. The EU is not designed to think geopolitically but, in its quest for a zone of comfort in the east, it has pursued association agreements and supported the “Euromaidan” movement in Ukraine – both of which play into Washington’s hands. The EU’s obvious inability to manage the aftermath of Viktor Yanukovich’s ouster has put it in the back seat. Moscow and Washington are the players on centre court.

美国也在通过类似的透镜看待整个世界。在美国眼中，坐视乌克兰政府滑入俄罗斯政府的轨道，可能意味着俄罗斯帝国的复兴。一个亲西方并且在经济上较为成功的乌克兰，会使俄罗斯无法恢复历史上的版图，并能削弱俄罗斯的独裁政治。理论上说，欧盟(EU)并不会从地缘政治的角度考虑问题。不过，出于在其东部建立安全区域的要求，欧盟始终在寻求与乌克兰签署入盟协议，并始终支持乌克兰的“亲欧盟示威运动(Euromaidan)”。以上举动都正中美国政府下怀。在维克多•亚努科维奇(Viktor Yanukovich)被罢免之后，欧盟显然无法应对由此引发的一系列后果，这种无能为力致使欧盟落到末席。于是俄罗斯和美国成为舞台中央的主角。

Until yesterday, when Kiev began a military operation in Ukraine’s east, the Kremlin neither needed nor intended to use military force there. Its army was lining up across the border to deter Kiev from using its own forces against pro-Russian activists, and to dissuade the US and Nato from meddling. A Russian intervention becomes more likely if there is a full-blown civil war.

直至周二，当乌克兰政府开始在乌克兰东部采取军事行动时，克里姆林宫既没有在该地区动武的必要，也没有这种意愿。俄罗斯军队在边境集结，是为了震慑乌克兰政府，阻止它向亲俄活动人士动用自身武力，并阻止美国和北约(Nato)的干涉。而一旦乌克兰全面爆发内战，俄罗斯采取干涉行为的可能性就会变得更大。

The Kremlin is often accused of fomenting instability in Ukraine as a pretext for invasion. In reality, Russia’s main objective is to help the country’s Russophile southeast to assert itself and create a new political balance within Ukraine. It wants acceptance for official use of the Russian language where it is spoken; direct election of governors, which would create regional elites accountable to their Russian-speaking constituencies and form a counterweight to the pro-western elites in Kiev; continuing economic relations with Russia, especially in the defence industrial area; and, lastly, for Ukraine to maintain a neutral relationship with Nato.

人们经常指责俄罗斯政府，为找到入侵借口而煽动乌克兰的不稳定局面。事实上，俄罗斯的主要目标是帮助乌克兰亲俄的东南部发出自己的声音，并在乌克兰内部创造新的政治平衡。俄罗斯希望乌克兰接受目前讲俄语的地区把俄语作为官方语言；希望实现地方长官的直接选举，这样就能产生一批对讲俄语的选民负责的地区上层人士，并形成对乌克兰政府中亲西方人士的制衡；希望乌克兰能够延续与俄罗斯的经济往来，尤其是在国防工业领域；最后，俄罗斯还希望乌克兰保持与北约间的中立关系。

Ukraine is a large and complex country. Ukrainians are not Russians, as Mr Putin will have to admit. They are not “one people”, even among themselves. But equally, not all those who reject a narrow version of Ukrainian nationalism are Russian agents.

乌克兰是一个情况复杂的大国。普京将不得不承认的一点是，乌克兰人不是俄罗斯人。乌克兰人和俄罗斯人，即使是他们自己，也不认为彼此是“一家人”。不过，与此同理，并非所有拒绝乌克兰狭隘民族主义的人都是俄国间谍。

Moscow’s recent actions, from Crimea on, have released a historical paranoia in eastern Europe. Elsewhere, they have revived ideological clichés that date from the battle against Soviet communism, and helped fuel a still older fear that the west will for ever try to hold Russia down. Ukraine is a test.

自克里米亚事件以来，俄罗斯的种种举动把东欧过去的妄想症又引发出来了。在其他地区，这些举动更让一些意识形态方面的陈词滥调死灰复燃，它们可以上溯到与苏维埃共产主义对抗的时期。此外，这些举动还激起了一种历史更久远的恐惧感：西方将会永不停息地试图压制俄罗斯。而乌克兰则是一次考验。

If it is allowed to break up – or made to do so – Russia and the west will spin into a confrontation from which both will emerge the losers. Both sides need to keep Ukraine whole. They cannot allow a clash of civilisations to become a self-realising fantasy.

如果坐视乌克兰分裂——或直接促成乌克兰分裂，俄罗斯与西方将卷入一场对抗，双方都会成为输家。因此，双方都有必要保持乌克兰的完整。他们不能任由一场文明之间的冲突演变成一种自我实现的幻想。