全球化时代 西方不再自信

For the first half of my life, international politics was defined by the cold war. The fall of the Berlin Wall ended that era and began another one: the age of globalisation. Now, 25 years later, it feels like we are once again witnessing the close of an era.

在我的前半生，国际政治格局是由冷战决定的。柏林墙的倒塌终结了冷战时代，开启了另一个时代：全球化时代。如今，25年过去，我们似乎正再次见证一个时代的结束。

The sense that things are changing is strongest in the realm of ideas. In the past few years, the west has lost confidence in the strength of the three props on which the post-cold war world has been constructed: markets, democracy and American power.

这种世事无常的感觉在意识形态领域最为强烈。在过去几年里，西方对支撑起冷战后世界的三大支柱的力量失去了信心，它们是：市场、民主和美国力量。

The success of these three ideas was, of course, connected. Once the cold war had ended it was natural to ask why the western system had prevailed. The obvious conclusion was that democratic, market-based systems had simply outperformed command economies and authoritarian politics. As the popular saying went: “Freedom works.” The result was that the US was not just the only superpower left standing. It also enjoyed intellectual hegemony.

这三种观念的成功当然是相互关连的。冷战一结束，人们自然会提出一个问题：为什么西方制度获胜了？最明显的结论是，民主的、基于市场的制度就是比计划经济和威权政治好。套用当时的流行说法：“自由成功了。”结果是，美国不仅成了唯一屹立不倒的超级大国，它还享有观念霸权。

After the fall of the wall, there was a new vigour behind the spread of market economics and democratic politics around the world. It was appropriate that the free-market consensus championed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund came to be known as the “Washington consensus”.

柏林墙倒塌后，市场经济和民主政治在全球的传播焕发了新的活力。世界银行(World Bank)和国际货币基金组织(IMF)所倡导的那种自由市场共识被称为“华盛顿共识”，这个名称是恰如其分的。

The political equivalent of the Washington consensus was the belief that democracy would eventually triumph not just in eastern Europe but all over the world. And in the 1990s countries as diverse as South Africa, Chile and Indonesia did indeed complete successful transitions to democracy. Underpinning these economic and political developments was the fact that the US was the unchallenged global superpower and at the centre of the military and strategic system all over the world — from Latin America to east Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

与华盛顿共识对应的政治共识是：相信民主最终会获取胜利，不止在东欧，还将在全世界。上世纪90年代，南非、智利和印度尼西亚等差异巨大的国家，确实都成功完成了向民主的转型。支撑这些经济和政治动向的是一个客观事实，即美国是无人可以挑战的全球超级大国，占据全世界——从拉丁美洲到东亚、中东和欧洲——军事和战略体系的中心。

In many ways that is the world we still live in. And yet there are growing doubts in the west about the trinity of ideas around which the post cold-war world has been constructed: markets, democracy and American power. In each case, there was a signature event that served to undermine confidence.

从很多方面而言，我们依然生活在这样一个世界。然而西方对支撑冷战后世界的三大观念——市场、民主和美国力量——越来越怀疑。对于每一个观念，都有一个标志性事件足以动摇人们对它的信心。

The faith in free markets was severely shaken by the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent Great Recession — and has never really recovered. Although the global depression that many feared was avoided, the exuberant belief in the ability of free markets to raise living standards all over the world has not returned. In much of the west, economic debate is instead dominated by discussion of income inequality — with Europe adding an extra layer of anxiety about the euro and high unemployment. Star emerging markets such as Brazil and India have lost their fizz, and even China is slowing. The belief that there is a market-based formula out there that all sensible policy makers can adopt — a “Washington consensus” — has faded, to be replaced by a global lack of consensus.

2008年的金融危机和随后的经济大衰退(Great Recession)——迄今没有真正恢复——严重动摇了人们对自由市场的信心。虽然许多人所担心的全球性衰退没有发生，但人们不再对自由市场有能力提高全世界生活水平抱有强烈信念。在西方世界大部分地区，主导经济辩论的反而是关于收入不平等的讨论，在欧洲，还要加上两个令人担忧的问题——欧元和高失业率。巴西、印度等新兴市场之星已经失去了活力，就连中国的经济都在放缓。对于存在一个基于市场的标准方案、可供所有明智的政策制定者采纳的信念，即“华盛顿共识”，已逐渐消失，取而代之的是全球性的缺乏共识。

Democratic evangelism, meanwhile, has been undermined by the horrors unleashed by the Arab uprisings. The wave of revolutionary change that hit the Middle East in 2011 initially looked like the Arab equivalent of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Authoritarian systems were tumbling and new democracies seemed to be emerging. But the failure of democracy to take root in any of the countries that underwent revolutions, with the exception of Tunisia, has undermined faith in the inevitable advance of political freedom.

与此同时，阿拉伯地区此起彼伏的起义所带来的恐惧，打击了对民主的狂热。这股在2011年冲击中东的革命浪潮，最初看上去像阿拉伯版的柏林墙倒塌。专制政体被推翻，新的民主国家似乎即将诞生。但除突尼斯以外，民主没有在任何一个经历了革命的国家扎下根来，动摇了政治自由必将推进的信念。

Just as troubling, in some ways, is an emerging loss of faith in the ability of established democracies to deliver competent government. In the US, respect for Congress is at near-record lows. In European states such as Italy and France, the political systems seem incapable of delivering reform or growth — and voters are flirting with extremist parties.

某些方面而言同样令人不安的是，人们开始对成熟民主国家提供称职治理的能力丧失信心。在美国，国会的威望已接近历史最低水平。在意大利、法国等欧洲国家，其政治制度似乎无法为改革或增长提供土壤，选民开始跟极端主义政党眉目传情。

The third prop of the age of globalisation is American power. That, too, looks less reliable than it did a decade ago. Here the central event was the Iraq war.

全球化时代的第三个支柱是美国的实力。这一点看起来似乎也没有十年前那么可靠，就这一点而言的核心事件是伊拉克战争。

That conflict, unleashed by President George W Bush, initially looked like a triumphant demonstration of US might as Saddam Hussein was swept from power. But America’s inability to stabilise Iraq or Afghanistan, despite many years of effort, has demonstrated that while the US military can destroy a hostile regime in weeks, it cannot guarantee a stable postwar settlement. More than a decade after the fall of Baghdad, America is back at war in Iraq — and the Middle East as a whole is in a state of violent anarchy.

一开始，萨达姆•侯赛因(Saddam Hussein)被扫地下台，这场小布什(George W. Bush)总统发动的战争似乎成功证明了美国的实力。但美国努力多年，仍无力让伊拉克或阿富汗恢复稳定，证明了美军虽能在数周内摧毁一个敌对政权，却不能为一个稳定的战后安排打包票。在巴格达陷落十多年后，美国眼下又重返伊拉克战场，而整个中东都正处于暴力无政府状态。

The rise of China has also raised questions about how long America’s reign as “sole superpower” can continue. In October the IMF announced that — measured in terms of purchasing power — China is now the world’s largest economy. It is still miles away from matching America’s international political reach. But America’s own ability and willingness to sustain its role as global hegemon is open to question.

中国的崛起也提出一个问题：美国的“唯一超级大国”支配地位还能维持多久？去年10月，IMF宣布，以购买力计算，中国已成为全球最大经济体。中国与美国的国际政治影响力还相差甚远，但美国本身在维持全球霸主地位方面的能力和意愿都值得商榷。

That said, it is worth remembering that the fall of the Berlin Wall came at a time when many in the US were obsessed with the rise of Japan. That should serve as a reminder of how quickly the intellectual climate can shift and fashionable preoccupations fade. But, while the start of the year has seen a revival of the US economy, the revival of the west’s intellectual self-confidence still looks a long way off.

即便如此，应该记住的是，柏林墙倒塌的时候，许多美国人正纠结于日本的崛起。我们应引以为戒，记住观念氛围可以转变得多么迅速，流行的偏见可以消失得多么快。不过，虽然今年年初美国经济已出现复苏的迹象，想恢复西方世界的观念自信看起来仍有很长的路要走。