日本因何丧失电子业霸主地位?大纲

During a business trip to Japan in 2004, technology analyst Michael Gartenberg caught a glimpse of Sony Corp.'s Librie, the first e-Reader to use electronic ink displays now common in today's devices.
2004年，科技分析师迈克尔•加滕伯格(Michael Gartenberg)在日本出差时偶然看到索尼公司(Sony Corp.)的电子阅读器Librie。它是第一款采用电子墨水显示屏的电子阅读器，如今这种显示屏已被普遍应用于电子阅读器。

Mr. Gartenberg was impressed with the lightweight design and long battery life and brought it back to the U.S., seeing it as a harbinger of a new wave of products.
Librie机身轻盈，而且电池续航时间长，给加滕伯格留下了深刻印象，于是他把这部阅读器带回了美国，把它视为新一波电子产品的前兆。

But there were problems with the Librie. The software was in Japanese. It required a computer to download a book. The selection was limited, and books were only available for 60-day rental.
但是，Librie也存在一些问题，比如说它的软件是日文的，下载电子书还得用电脑，而且它提供的选择非常少，电子书只能租看60天时间。

Sony stopped selling the Librie in 2007 - the same year that Inc. sparked the e-reader boom with the Kindle, a wireless device with a large selection of e-books and an easy-to-use download service. Now Sony is playing catch-up with its successor device, the Reader, which ranked a distant third in the global market, with just 5% share in 2011, according to research firm IDC.
后来，索尼在2007年停售Librie，也就是在这一年，亚马逊公司( Inc.)凭借Kindle引发了电子阅读器热潮。Kindle具有无线上网功能，有一大批电子书可供选择，而且其下载服务也简便易用。如今，索尼正凭借其电子阅读器Reader追赶竞争对手。据国际数据公司(IDC)统计, Reader在全球市场的份额位列第三，远远落后于前两名，其在2011年的全球市场份额只有5%。

'Even though the first device definitely pointed the way to the future, it's a market that got away from Sony,' said Mr. Gartenberg, research director at technology research firm Gartner Inc. 'Others have far more successfully capitalized.'
身为科技行业研究公司Gartner研究总监的加滕伯格称，尽管（索尼的）第一部电子书阅读器明确指明了通向未来的发展道路，但如今这个市场却不是由索尼主导，其他企业从中所获得的利益已经远远超过了它。

It is a story that has played out repeatedly over the last 20 years for Japan's once-world-dominant electronics firms. During that period, Japanese companies have beaten rivals to the market with hardware breakthroughs - from flat-panel televisions to advanced mobile phones. But in each case, foreign rivals have cashed in by delivering faster improvements, integrating the products with intuitive software and online services, cutting costs more deftly, and delivering a smarter marketing message.
过去20年来，这样的故事不断地在日本曾经称霸于世的电子产品公司身上上演。在这期间，日本企业在硬件方面的突破胜过了竞争对手，从平板电视到高端手机均是如此。然而，在这两项业务中，它们的海外竞争对手通过实现更快速的技术改进、在产品中集成直观简便的软件和在线服务、更巧妙地削减成本和推出更灵活的营销信息而大赚特赚。That is a contrast with the glory days of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Japan started to dominate theworld of consumer electronics. As the Japanese economy surged, its electronics conglomerates ruled the market for memory chips, color televisions, and videocassette recorders, while their research labs gave birth to gadgets that would define an era: the Walkman, CD and DVD players.
这与上世纪70年代末和80年代初的情况形成了鲜明对比，当时日本开始垄断世界消费电子产品市场。随着日本经济飞速发展，该国的电子业巨头也开始统治内存芯片、彩色电视和盒式磁带录像机市场，它们的研发实验室开发出了一批定义了一个时代的产品，例如随身听、CD和DVD播放机。

Now Japan's device makers are an afterthought to Amazon, Apple Inc., Google Inc., and Korea's Samsung Electronics Co. No longer the kings of electronics, Sony, Panasonic Corp. and Sharp Corp. combined to lose about $20 billion in the past fiscal year. Compare that to the $6.4 billion in record profits those firms delivered only four years earlier.
如今，日本的电子产品生产商落后于亚马逊、苹果(Apple Inc.)、谷歌(Google Inc.)和韩国的三星电子(Samsung Electronics Co.)。它们不再是电子行业的王者，在上一财年，索尼、松下(Panasonic Corp.)和夏普(Sharp Corp.)共计亏损了约200亿美元。就在四年前，这些企业取得了64亿美元的创纪录利润。

Japan's current weakness is rooted in its traditional strength: a fixation with 'monozukuri,' or the art of making things, focused on hardware advances.
日本当前的疲弱根植于其传统优势──专守“monozukuri”（即制造的艺术），专注于硬件的改进。这一理念是日本民族自豪感的来源，它推动该国的电子公司竭力生产常常是世界上最薄最小的产品或是推出其他渐进的技术进步，但是它们忽视了人们真正关心的因素，例如产品的设计和使用的便利度。

This concept, a source of national pride, pushed Japan's electronics firms to strive for products that were often the world's thinnest, smallest, or delivered other incremental improvement - while losing sight of factors that really mattered to people such as design and ease of use.
以电子阅读器业务为例，索尼专注于销售设备，而亚马逊则专注于销售电子书。结果是，Kindle更加符合人们购买电子阅读器的根本理由──买书、看书。剩下的事情大家都知道了。

In the case of the e-reader, Sony was focused on selling devices, while Amazon was focused on selling books. As a result, the Kindle was more in tune with the raison d'etre for purchasing the device: to buy and read books. And the rest was history.

今年6月份，津贺一宏(Kazuhiro Tsuga)在接任松下总裁的新闻发布会上说道：“日本企业对自己的技术和制造技能太自信了，我们忽略了要从消费者的角度看待产品。”在此之前，松下出现了公司94年历史上最严重的年度亏损。

'Japanese firms were too confident about our technology and manufacturing prowess. We lost sight of the products from the consumer's point of view,' said Panasonic President Kazuhiro Tsuga at a news conference in June upon taking over as the company's new president after it posted the biggest annual loss in its 94-year history.
火上浇油的是，在日圆走强的形势下，日本企业跟上创新技术、同时又要进行必要的成本削减以吸引普通大众变得更困难。在尖端技术产品方面，日本企业常常依赖于在国内生产，然后把产品销往海外。然而，由于日圆汇率上升到接近历史高位的水平，日本在海外销售的商品的利润空间缩窄，但韩国制造商因为韩圆相对疲软而避开了这个问题。此外，利润受到侵蚀也使企业难以对未来产品和技术进行投资。To compound matters, the strong yen has made it more difficult to follow up new innovations with the requisite cost reductions to appeal to the mass market. For cutting-edge products, Japanese firms often rely on domestic production and then sell the goods abroad. The strong yen, near record levels, has narrowed the profit margin of Japanese goods sold abroad - a problem that Korean manufacturers have avoided with the relatively weaker won. The erosion in earnings has also made it difficult to invest in future products and technologies.
日本丧失行业领先地位的最新例证是，在开发有可能成为下一代电视的主导性技术标准──有机发光二极管（OLED）的竞争中，该国企业又处于落后境地。这种新型显示器更薄而且能耗更低。

In the latest example of the country's lose-the-lead affliction, Japanese companies are falling behind in the race to develop what is likely to become the dominant technology format for next-generation televisions: OLEDs, or organic light emitting diodes. The new displays are thinner and require less energy.
韩国顶级电视制造商三星已经在小型OLED显示屏市场占据主导地位，这种屏幕常用于智能手机和其他移动设备中。如今，三星及其本土竞争对手LG Electronics均计划在今年晚些时候推出55英寸的OLED电视。

Samsung, Korea's top TV maker, already dominates the market for smaller-size OLED displays featured in smartphones and other mobile devices. Now Samsung and domestic rival LG Electronics Co. each plans to launch a 55-inch OLED television later this year.
与索尼、松下、夏普和东芝(Toshiba Corp.)这些日本企业相比，这是一个很大的进步，这些公司花费了多年时间研发这一技术，同时也在苦苦思索如何将其商业化。为了试着缩小与韩国竞争对手的差距，索尼和松下这两个宿怨已久的对手史无前例地在6月同意结成联盟，共同开发OLED生产技术。

It is a major step forward compared to the Japanese firms - Sony, Panasonic, Sharp, and Toshiba Corp. - that have spent years developing the technology while struggling with how to commercialize it. In an attempt to close the gap on their Korean rivals, Sony and Panasonic, once bitter rivals, agreed to an unprecedented alliance in June to develop OLED production technology together.
这是索尼的悲惨衰落，索尼五年前就已成为首家销售OLED电视的制造商。当时索尼的高管大赞它是“索尼复兴的标志”。这个11英寸机型的屏幕大概只有1/10英寸厚，是一个技术上的奇迹。然而，高达2,500美元的价格使这款OLED电视在财务收益方面大败。

That is a poignant comedown for Sony, which five years ago became the first manufacturer to sell an OLED television. At the time, company executives hailed it a 'symbol of Sony's comeback.' The 11-inch model - with a screen about one-tenth of an inch thick - was a technological marvel. But at $2,500 a pop, the OLED television was a financial flop.
索尼在OLED电视业务的失败距其在上一代电视技术方面遭遇的相同挫折仅隔了数年时间。2004年，索尼成为首家推出液晶电视的公司，该类电视以亮度更高、也更节能的发光二极管(LED)取代了荧光背光源。此外，索尼还在2008年率先推出第一台在四周的边框配备LED的电视，从而使屏幕变得更薄。

The OLED stumble came just a few years after a similar setback in the last generation of TV technology. In 2004, Sony was the first company to introduce LCD televisions that replaced the TV's fluorescent backlight with brighter and more energy efficient light-emitting diodes, or LEDs. It also introduced the first TV that arranged the LEDs around the edges in 2008 to allow the screens to be thinner.
三星在一年之后推出了其生产的机型，并把它们称为LED电视，以把这种新型电视与当时已有的LCD电视区别开来。这个营销战略获得了成功，三星让消费者花高价购买这种新型LED电视，从而帮助延缓了电视价格的急剧下跌。据市场研究公司NPD统计，在2012年上半年，三星在北美的LED电视市场占据了近半的市场份额，而索尼的排名还没有进入前五。

When Samsung came out with its models a year later, the company called them 'LED TVs,' a moniker to distinguish the new TVs from existing LCD models. The marketing strategy was a success and Samsung was able to get consumers to pay a premium for the new LED models, helping to slow the sharp decline in TV prices. According to research firm NPD, Samsung accounts for nearly half of all the LED televisions sold in North America while Sony did not rank among the top five sellers in the first half of 2012.
在多年都错失机会之后，索尼正式改变了发展方向，认为让三星和其他公司在开发新技术上担任领头羊实际上更加合理。索尼在率先推出突破性技术方面吃尽了苦头，该公司高管得出结论，他们这么做只是让竞争对手有了追赶的目标，并可能以更低的成本进行模仿。

After years of missed chances, Sony has officially shifted gears, deciding that it actually makes more sense to let Samsung and others take the lead in developing new innovations. For all its pains of delivering groundbreaking technologies first, Sony executives concluded they were only creating targets for competitors to pursue and possibly imitate at a cheaper cost.
在今年4月份接掌索尼首席战略长一职的齐藤正(Tadashi Saito)说，领跑者得顶着风，有时候在后面跑会更容易。另一位熟悉索尼想法的高管称，索尼在电视业务上的亏损使其更难在OLED业务上大赌一把。

'The first runner has to face the wind - sometimes, it's easier to run from behind,' said Tadashi Saito, who took over in April as Sony's chief strategy officer. Another official familiar with Sony's thinking said the losses at its television business made it harder to take a 'gamble' on aggressively pursuing OLED.
这与索尼创建初期的情况存在很大差距，当时创始人盛田昭夫(Akio Morita)和井深大(Masaru Ibuka)为了生产一种新型彩电几乎使公司破产。在1964年发布原型机后，由于资金耗尽，索尼开始努力开发量产技术。索尼花了四年时间进行研发，然后才推出了奠定该公司后来30年成功基础的彩色显像管“特丽珑”。