In Japan “I am Kenji” has replaced “I am Charlie” as the rallying cry of choice. The Kenji in question is Kenji Goto, a respected freelance journalist captured by militants from Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) in Syria. On Saturday, a video was released of Mr Goto wearing a now all-too-familiar orange jump suit. He was holding up a photograph of what appeared to be the body of another Japanese hostage, Haruna Yukawa, who was almost certainly beheaded after Tokyo refused to pay a $200m ransom. Isis is demanding the release of an al-Qaeda militant being held in Jordan. If she is not freed, it has warned, Mr Goto will be the next to die. Much more than the fate of Mr Goto hangs in the balance. Japan’s foreign policy, rooted in its pacifist constitution, stands at a tipping point. How the public reacts to the fate of Mr Goto could have a big influence on where things go from here. Two related changes are under way. First Shinzo Abe, the conservative prime minister, is seeking to establish a more robust defence posture, one he has termed “proactive pacifism”. That doctrine has been used to justify everything from selling arms to allies — until recently strictly forbidden — to beefing up maritime defence around islands disputed with China. In particular, he wants to change a constitutional interpretation that bars Japan from helping allies if they come under attack. Ideally, he would also like to scrap article nine of Japan’s 1947 constitution, in which Tokyo forever renounces the right to wage war. In practice, that is likely to prove impossible because a strongly pacifist public would almost certainly reject such an amendment in an obligatory referendum. Second, after years in which Tokyo sought to present itself as neutral on the world stage, Mr Abe is trying to nudge Japan towards taking a stand. Since the second world war, Japan has pursued what has been imaginatively called “omnidirectional diplomacy”. Crudely put, that has meant pretending to be everyone’s friend while pursuing its own economic interests. Meanwhile, the nasty business of defending Japan has been outsourced to the US. Omnidirectional diplomacy has had its uses. In 1973, for example, faced with a ruinous oil embargo, Japanese diplomats distanced themselves from US support of Israel in the Yom Kippur war by presenting Tokyo as a friend to the Arab world. Oil flowed to Japan again. A decade ago, Tokyo played a similar card in Iran. By wooing Tehran, it won a concession to the huge Azadegan oilfield only for Washington to scupper the deal in the name of sanctions. The illusion of neutrality is becoming harder to pull off[NOT QUITE CLEAR ON THIS SENTENCE?]. Japan’s economic clout has waned, and geostrategic faultlines have widened with the rise of China and the 9/11 attacks on the US. The hostage crisis could cut both ways for Mr Abe’s foreign policy ambitions. He will try to use the incident as evidence that Japan needs to stand up for itself more. Unlike many other nations, it has no commando unit ready to mount a rescue mission nor any constitutional leeway to take military action against foreign forces who seek to harm its nationals. Yukio Okamoto, a defence expert and supporter of Mr Abe’s diplomatic agenda, says the kidnapping has exposed the Japanese public to the world’s uncomfortable realities. “We can no longer hide behind camouflaged neutrality,” he says. Many in Japan will draw precisely the opposite conclusion. The incident, they will say, shows the perils of being sucked into foreign adventures. From the isolation and rarefied comfort of Japan, the rest of the world can seem like a blood-curdling place in which monotheistic religions vie for supremacy. Mr Abe has been criticised in parliament for offering $200m in humanitarian support to opponents of Isis. That, say critics, was a like a red rag to the fundamentalist bull. “Many people are saying: ‘Why do we want to be America’s deputy sheriff? Do we really want to stick our necks out?’” says Jeff Kingston, a professor of international studies at Tokyo’s Temple University. The outcome of the debate may well hinge on the fate of Mr Goto. Unlike the executed Yukawa, a fantasist who stumbled into the Middle East after claiming to be the reincarnation of a Manchu princess, Mr Goto elicits plenty of public sympathy. A humanitarian who has devoted much of his journalistic career to exposing the hardships of children in war zones, he went to Syria in a desperate attempt to rescue the hapless Yukawa. If he is released, as seemed possible yesterday, Mr Abe’s hand will be strengthened. His no-compromise diplomacy will be seen to have borne results, even if Mr Goto’s freedom is won through a Jordanian hostage exchange. If on the other hand, Mr Goto ends up dead, public support for foreign engagement could waver. That could make it harder for Mr Abe to pass laws needed to bolster his constitutional reinterpretation. In the long run, however, any setback is likely to be temporary. The world is changing. China is pressing its territorial claims on Japan. The US is seen by many in Tokyo as an undependable ally, unlikely, if push comes to shove, to spill American blood in Japan’s defence. Meanwhile, the Middle East, on whose oil Japan remains dependent, has gone up in ideological flames. For Tokyo, the days of sitting on the fence are ending. 在日本，“我是健二”已取代“我是查理”成为最流行的口号。这里的健二是指后藤健二(Kenji Goto)，一位倍受尊敬的、被叙利亚“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国”(ISIS)武装分子虏获的自由记者。上周六，健二穿着人们现在已再熟悉不过的橙色连体衣出现在一段被公布的视频中。他手中举着一张照片，上面似乎是另一名日本人质汤川遥菜(Haruna Yukawa)的尸体——几乎可以肯定，在日本政府拒绝支付2亿美元赎金之后，汤川遥菜已被斩首。ISIS要求释放关押在约旦的一名基地组织女武装分子。ISIS警告称，如果不释放此人，健二将成为下一个被斩首的对象。 不只是健二的命运前途未卜。植根于其和平宪法的日本外交政策正处于一个临界点。公众对健二的命运做出什么反应，可能对今后局势的发展具有重要的影响。 两个相关的改变正在发生。首先，持保守主义立场的日本首相安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)正在寻求建立一种更为坚定的防御姿态——他将此称为“积极的和平主义”(proactive pacifism)。日本利用这一原则来证明其从向盟国出售军火（直至最近才被严厉禁止）到在与中国存在纠纷的岛屿附近增强海上防御力量等所有行动的正当性。 特别是，他希望修改禁止日本在盟国受到攻击时出兵援助的宪法解释。理想情况下，他还希望废除日本1947年宪法第九条——其主要内容是，日本政府永久性放弃发动战争的权利。在现实中，事实可能证明这是不可能的，因为这类修订必须要举行全民公投，而几乎可以肯定，强烈热爱和平的日本公众不会同意。 其次，在日本多年寻求在世界舞台上树立中立形象之后，安倍晋三正努力推动日本摆明立场。自二战以来，日本推行的是一种被创造性地称为“全方位外交”的政策。大致来说，这意味着日本要装扮成所有人的朋友，同时追求自己的经济利益。与此同时，棘手的日本防务事务被外包给了美国。 全方位外交有它的用处。例如，在1973年，面对破坏性的石油禁运局面，日本外交官将日本展示为阿拉伯世界的朋友，没有在赎罪日战争中与美国一起支持以色列。石油再次流向了日本。十年前，日本政府在伊朗采取了类似的做法。通过向德黑兰示好，日本赢得了石油储量巨大的阿扎德干(Azadegan)油田的开采权，只是后来美国以制裁的名义才破坏了该协议。日本现在越来越难以维持中立假象。日本的经济影响力已经下降，而随着中国崛起和美国爆发911恐怖袭击事件，地缘政治断层线也在扩大。 对安倍晋三的外交政策抱负来说，人质危机既有利也有弊。他将努力利用该事件表明，日本需要加大保护自己的力度。与其他许多国家不同，日本没有突击队展开救援行动，在宪法上也没有对寻求伤害其国民的外国力量采取军事行动的空间。 支持安倍晋三外交议程的防务专家冈本行夫(Yukio Okamoto)表示，人质事件让日本公众认识到了这个世界令人不安的现实。他说：“我们不能再躲藏在伪装的中立形象背后了。” 日本有许多人将会得出正好相反的结论。他们将会说，该事件表明卷入海外行动非常危险。与日本的与世隔绝和宁静祥和不同，世界其他地区似乎是一个令人毛骨悚然的地区，各种一神论宗教竞相宣称只有自己才具有至高无上的地位。由于向ISIS的对手提供了2亿美元的人道主义援助，安倍晋三一直在议会受到批评。批评者称，这激怒了原教旨主义者。 东京天普大学(Temple University)从事国际研究的杰夫•金斯顿(Jeff Kingston)教授表示：“许多人会说：‘我们为何想要成为美国的副警长？我们真的想要惹祸上身吗？’”这种辩论的结果可能取决于健二的命运。 与被斩首的汤川遥菜不同——汤川遥菜是一名幻想家，他在宣称自己是清朝的一名公主转世之后进入中东地区——健二引起了公众的强烈同情。健二是一名人道主义者，他在其大部分记者职业生涯中都致力于报道战区儿童的艰辛。他来到叙利亚，准备孤注一掷地营救不幸的汤川遥菜。 如果健二获释（从昨天的情况来看，这似乎有可能），安倍的影响力将得到加强。他的不妥协外交政策将被视为取得了成果，即便健二的获释是通过交换约旦战俘取得的。另一方面，如果健二最终死亡，公众对安倍海外行动的支持可能会动摇。 这可能让安倍晋三更难推动通过支持其重新解释宪法所需的法律。然而，长期而言，任何挫折都可能是暂时的。世界正在改变。中国正在强硬地对日本提出领土主张。美国被东京许多人视为不可信赖的盟友，当到了紧要关头，美国不太可能牺牲美国人的生命来为日本提供防务。与此同时，中东地区已然置身于意识形态的大火——日本如今依然依赖该地区的石油供应。对日本政府来说，骑墙的日子即将结束。
