只有中国才能牵制中国

When Xi Jinping visits the U.S. this autumn, one of the items on his agenda is bound to be what he has called a "new type of major power relations." The term remains ambiguous and some Americans fear that it is a device for disrupting American alliances. Chinese scholars reply that it is a genuine effort to avoid the dangerous dynamics between a rising and an established power that helped precipitate the Peloponnesian War and World War I.

当习近平今年秋天访问美国时，他的议程上的项目之一必然是他所谓的"大国关系的新类型"。这个词仍然含糊不清，一些美国人担心它会分裂美国联盟。中国学者回答说，它是真诚的努力，旨在避免一个崛起的大国和一个根基稳固的大国之间的危险的动态关系，而这种关系可以推进伯罗奔尼萨战争和第一次世界大战发生。

Looking ahead, pessimists predict an impending clash as China grows stronger and seeks to expel the U.S. from the Western Pacific. Some argue that this can be forestalled by the acceptance of spheres of influence in which the U.S. restricts its activities primarily to the Eastern Pacific. But such a response to China's rise would destroy American credibility and lead regional states into bandwagoning rather than balancing China. Instead, a continued U.S. presence in the Western Pacific can reinforce the natural balancing reactions of regional states and help to shape the environment in a way that encourages responsible Chinese behavior.

展望未来，悲观者预测：随着中国变得更加强大，试图从西太平洋驱逐美国，冲突即将发生。一些人认为通过美国限制自身活动（主要是东太平洋）的影响范围，可以预先阻止冲突。但对中国崛起的如此大的反响会摧毁美国的信誉，导致区域各国也会对中国亦步亦趋，而不是平衡中国。相反，美国在西太平洋的继续存在能加强区域各国的自然平衡反应，有助于塑造环境，在某种程度上鼓励中国采取负责任的行为。

An appropriate policy response to the rise of China must balance realism and integration. When the Clint on Administration first considered how to respond to the rise of China in the 1990s, some critics urged a policy of containment before China became too strong. We rejected such advice for two reasons. First, it would have been impossible to forge an anti-China alliance since most countries in the region wanted (an d still want) good relations with both the U.S. and China. Even more important, such a policy would have unnecessarily guaranteed future enmity with China. As I used to say in my speeches when I was responsible for East Asia in the Pentagon, if you treat China as an enemy, you are certain to have an enemy.

适当的应对中国崛起的政策必须平衡现实和整体。在上世纪90年代，当克林顿政府首先考虑如何应对中国崛起时，有评论员呼吁在中国变得过于强大之前对其剪政策。我们有两个理由拒绝这祥的建议。首先,我们不可结成反华联盟，因为该地区大多数国家希望(现在仍然希望）与美国和中国都保持良好关系。更重要的是，这祥的政策不必要地保证了未来与中国为敌。正如我曾经在演讲中说当我在五角大楼负责东亚事务时，如果你把中国当作敌人,你就一定会拥有一个敌人。

Instead the U.S. chose a policy that could be called "integrate and insure." China was welcomed into the World Trade Organization, but the U.S.-Japan security treaty was revived to insure against China becoming a bully. If a rising China throws its weight around, it drives neighbors to seek to balance its power. In that sense, only China can contain China.

相反，美国选择了一个可以被称为"整体和保险"的政策。中国被欣然接纳，进了世界贸易组织，但《美日安全条约》被重启，旨在避免中国强大后以强凌弱。如果一个崛起的中国盛气凌人，它会驱使邻居寻求平衡它的力量。在这个意义上，只有中国才能遏制中国。

This is a key point in assessing the relative power of the U.S. and China. As Yan Xuetong wrote about how China could defeat America, "to shape a friendly international environment for its rise, Beijing needs to develop more high-quality diplomatic and military relationships than Washington. No leading power is able to have friendly relations with every country in the world, thus the core of competition between China and the United States will be to see who has more high-quality friends." At this point, the United States is better placed to benefit from such networks and alliances. Washington has about 60 treaty allies; China has few. In political alignments, The Economist estimates that of the 150 largest countries in the world, nearly 100 lean toward the United States; 21 lean against.

这是评估美国和中国的相对实力的一个关键点。正如阎学通所写的关于中国如何此能打败美国所言，"为中国的崛起塑造一个友好的国际环境，北京需要发展比华盛顿更优质的外交和军事关系。没有一个大国能够拥有世界上每个国家的友好关系，因而中国和美国之间的竞争核心将是看看谁拥有更多高品质的朋友。"在这一点上，美国能够更好地受益于这样的网络和联盟。美国有约60个盟友；而中国的盟友只有几个。在政治路线上，《经济学人》杂志估计世界上最大的150个国家中，有将近100个倾向美国；有21个倾向中国。

In 2011, the United States announced a strategy of rebalancing toward Asia, the fastest growing part of the world economy. Some Chinese see the Obama Administration policy of "rebalancing" towards Asia as a form of containment, but unlike the Cold War doctrine when the U.S. had virtually no trade or social contact with the Soviet Union, it has massive trade with China and more than 250,000 students in American universities. Shaping the environment for Chinese decisions is a more accurate description than containment for American strategy.

2011年，美国宣布对亚洲——世界经济增长最快的部分，实施再平衡战略。一些中国人认为奥巴马政府对亚洲的"再平衡"政策是一种遏制形式。但不像美国与苏联几乎没有任何贸易或社会交往时的冷战声明，美国和中国之间有大量贸易，有超过25万中国学生就读于美国大学。相对于美国战略遏制，一个更准确的描述是塑造中国的决策环境。

Some analysts see China as a revisionist state eager to overthrow the established international order as its strength increases. But China is not a full-fledged revisionist state like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union in the last century. While it has joined in the creation of a BRICS development bank, and promotes regional organizations that suit its needs, China has benefited greatly from, and is not eager to destroy, existing international institutions such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization -- as well as many others. American allies help shape the environment that encourages responsible behavior, and China cares about its reputation.

一些分析师认为中国是一个修正主义国家，随着其国力增强，急于推翻既定的国际秩序。但中国并不像纳粹德国或上个世纪的苏联，它并不是一个成熟的修正主义国家。虽然它已经参与创建了金砖国家发展银行，推进适合其需求的区域组织，而不是急于破坏现有的国际机构，如联合国，国际货币基金组织，以及世界贸易组织——以及许多其他组织，中国已经从中受益匪浅。美国的盟友帮助塑造鼓励中国负责任行为的环境，而中国也关心自己的声誉。

In addition, technological and social changes are adding a number of important transnational issues to the global agenda such as climate change, pandemics, terrorism, organized crime, and cyber crime. These issues represent not a transition of power among states, but a diffusion of power away from governments. Coping with these global threats will require increased inter-governmental cooperation that includes China, Europe and the United States and others.

此外，科技和社会的变化给全球议程增添了一些重要的跨国问题，如气候变化、流行病、恐怖主义、有组织犯罪和网络犯罪。这些问题不代表着权力在各国之间的过渡，而是代表着权力从政府的扩散。应对这些全球性威胁，需要增强包括中国、欧洲、美国和其他国家在内的政府间合作。

China aspires to play a larger role in East Asia, and the U.S. has Asian allies to whose defense it is committed. Miscalculations are always possible, but conflict is far from inevitable. The legitimacy of the Chinese government depends on a high rate of economic growth; the top leaders realize that China will need many decades before it approaches the sophistication of the American economy. Where Germany was pressing hard on Britain's heels (and passed it in industrial strength), the U.S. remains decades ahead of China in overall military, economic, and soft power resources at the global level. Moreover, China cannot afford a policy like that of the Kaiser's Germany. Too adventuresome a policy risks its gains and stability at home and abroad.

中国渴望在东亚发挥更大的作用，美国拥有亚洲盟国，美国承诺守护盟国国防安全。误判是可能的，但冲突并非不可避免。中国政府的合理性依赖于高经济增长率；最高领导人意识到中国将需要几十年才能像美国经济一样成熟。曾经德国对英国穷追不舍（并在工业实力上超过了它），而全球范围内，未来数十年美国仍然会在军事、经济和软实力资源方面整体领先中国。此外，中国不能承担像Kaiser（译者注：德国皇帝）的德国的政策。过于冒险的政策无疑给其在国内外的获益和稳定性增加了太多风险。

In other words, the United States has more time to manage it relations with a rising power than Britain did a century ago, and China has more incentives for restraint than Germany had. This provides an opportu nity to work out a new type of major power relationship if the U.S. continues to avoid containment as a s trategy, and if China accepts the legitimacy of the American presence in the Western Pacific. Whether the United States and China will manage to develop such a relationship is another question. Human error and miscalculation are always possible. But with the right choices, conflict is not inevitable.

换句话说,不像一个世纪前的英国，美国有更多的时间来处理它与一个正在崛起的大国之间的关系，而与德国相比，中国有更多动机来约束自己。如果美国继续避免遏制成为战略，如果中国接受美国在西太平洋存在的合理性，这就为制定一 个新型的大国关系提供了一个机会。美国和中国是否能建立这样的关系是另外一个问题。人为错误和误判是可能的。但有了正确的选择，冲突并非不可避免。