沙特给中东注入教派之毒

It is hard to see how Saudi Arabia’s New Year execution spree will send the signal it presumably intended: that of an absolute monarchy on which the sun will never set, laying down the law on its own terms with a sanguinary warning to would-be predators at home and abroad. It looks, instead, like a defensive message that injects yet more sectarian venom into the cauldron of the Middle East. That poison is not something the House of Saud or the Wahhabi clerical establishment that legitimises it can control, as the Sunni-Shia conflict they help incite keeps ripping the region apart.

很难看出沙特阿拉伯在新年之际的一通处决如何能够释放其可能想要释放的信号：这样一个日不落君主专制国家，按自己的方式制定律法，对国内外想要倚强凌弱的人发出血腥的警告。相反，这看起来像是一种防御性讯息，给中东的大锅里注入了更多宗派主义的毒液。这种毒不是沙特王室或赋予其执政合法性的瓦哈比(Wahhabi)宗教当权派能够控制的，他们煽动的逊尼派与什叶派的斗争不断地撕裂着这个地区。

Ever since last year’s nuclear deal between international powers led by the US and Iran, the kingdom’s arch-rival, started to look unstoppable, Saudi leaders appear to have reached three conclusions. Yes, they have been outplayed diplomatically and feel let down by their long-term American ally and patron. To their north — and in good part because of what they see as US bungling and lack of backbone, first in Iraq and then Syria — Tehran has cut a Shia arc through Arab lands from Baghdad to Beirut. They have repeatedly told Washington they regard what they see as Iran’s spearheading of a Shia jihad in the region as a greater threat than the Sunni jihadi menace of Isis.

自去年以美国为首的世界大国与沙特的主要对头伊朗看起来势必将达成核协议以后，沙特领袖似乎得出了3个结论。是的，他们在外交上落败，感觉自己被长期盟友和靠山美国辜负了。在他们看来，在沙特的北方，有很大一部分原因正是因为美国的失误和缺乏魄力，德黑兰在阿拉伯土地上切开了一个从巴格达到贝鲁特的什叶派弧形。他们已经反复告诉美国，在这个地区，他们认为他们所认定的伊朗什叶派圣战先锋比“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国”(ISIS)的逊尼派圣战威胁更大。

Thus Riyadh seems determined to ensure any Iran-backed incursion into the Gulf is off limits. The message is that the Arabian peninsula is terra sancta for (Sunni) Islam, which the House of Saud presumes to lead worldwide. There will be no Persian encroachment, and no quarter for local Shia — always abominated as idolaters by Wahhabi bigots but long seen by the Saudi government as fifth columnists for an Iran radicalised by its 1979 Islamic Revolution. The already dim prospect of a negotiated transition out of Syria’s civil war fades in the burning light of rekindled Saudi-Iranian enmity.

因此，利雅得似乎决心确保任何由伊朗支持的力量都不得入侵海湾地区。这其中的讯息是，阿拉伯半岛是（逊尼派）伊斯兰教圣地，沙特王室认为自己是（逊尼派）伊斯兰教理所当然的全球领导者。不允许波斯人的侵犯，也不会对当地什叶派心慈手软——瓦哈比顽固派一直憎恶他们，认为他们是偶像崇拜者，而沙特政府长期以来都将他们视为自1979年伊斯兰革命后变得激进化的伊朗的间谍。依靠协商结束叙利亚内战的希望原本就渺茫，在沙特和伊朗重新燃起的仇恨之火越烧越旺之际，这种希望几乎消失不见。

King Salman, who succeeded to the throne last year, underlined the message by launching a war in March in neighbouring Yemen against insurgent Shia Houthi forces. But, in case there was any ambiguity, Saudi Arabia has now executed Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, an outspoken cleric from the kingdom’s oil-rich eastern province, where the Shia are a majority. Nimr had long campaigned for the civil, religious and political rights that the Saudi state systematically denies its Shia. He unequivocally condemned violence yet he was executed as a terrorist. That 43 Sunni jihadis were simultaneously put to death, for bloody crimes of which they were convicted more than a decade ago, is seen by many Saudi Shia — an estimated 3m people — as cover for a political assassination they regard as a declaration of war.

去年继位的沙特国王萨勒曼(Salman)在3月份对邻国也门的什叶派胡塞(Houthi)叛军发起了战争，明确表明了这一讯息。但为了防止这一讯息的传达有任何模糊之处，沙特如今又处决了来自沙特石油资源丰富的东部省、言论大胆的教士谢赫尼米尔尼米尔(Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr)，他所来自的东部省什叶派占多数。尼米尔长期以来一直为什叶派的民权、宗教权利和政治权利奔走，沙特政府一直系统性地拒绝赋予国内什叶派这些权利。尼米尔明确谴责暴力，却以恐怖分子的罪名被处决。还有43名10多年前就因血腥罪行被定罪的逊尼派圣战份子此次也同时被处死，这在沙特国内许多什叶派人士（沙特据估计有300万什叶派）看来，不过是为了给一场政治暗杀打掩护，这场暗杀在他们看来无异于宣战。

They will be confirmed in this view by mainstream and social media commentary across the Gulf that drips with anti-Shia vitriol. There is, it is true, also contrasting opinion that emphasises conventional wisdom about how Sunni and Shia have rubbed along fine for centuries, intermingled and even intermarried, reached compromises and avoided catastrophes, and so on. Even though this is the standard discourse of Arab tyrants who have failed to build inclusive nations, it is not wrong — just, alas, irrelevant at a time when sectarian demons have been unleashed across the region.

海湾地区的主流媒体和社交媒体评论会让他们更加确信自己的这个观点：这个地区充斥着反什叶派的尖刻言论。的确，也有与此截然不同的观点，强调有关逊尼派和什叶派如何在数个世纪内融洽相处、杂居乃至通婚、达成妥协和避免灾难等等的常识。虽然这是一直未能建立包容性国家的阿拉伯暴君的标准论调，但这种说法并没有错——可惜，宗派主义的魔鬼已经在这个地区被释放出来，这种说法在此时此刻已经无关紧要了。

The ruling House of Saud and its Wahhabi backers have been primary disseminators of a puritan brand of muscular and exclusivist Sunni Islam, not just in Arab countries but across the Islamic world. Killing Nimr opens another compartment of this Pandora’s box — and at a time of their vulnerability rather than strength.

执政的沙特王室及其瓦哈比教派支持者一直是强悍而排他的严格逊尼派穆斯林教义的主要传播者，不仅仅在阿拉伯国家，还在整个伊斯兰世界。在他们实力虚弱而非强盛之际，处决尼米尔打开了这个潘多拉盒子的另一格。

The ruling family has shown extraordinary resilience over the past four decades: in the face of dislocating transformation at home from a desert kingdom forged by the sword to an oil titan and regional power; and against challenges whether from pan-Arab nationalists or rival brands of Islamism.

沙特王室在过去40年里表现出了非凡的韧性：经历了从一个以武立国的沙漠王国转变为石油大国和地区强国的混乱转型；并克服了来自无论是泛阿拉伯民族主义者还是伊斯兰敌对教派的挑战。

But three of the things they relied on — slow but steady decision-making, family cohesion and limitless cash — now seem in short supply. The oil price has crashed and reserves are being drawn down. Policy is in the hands of Mohammed bin Salman, the dynamic but untried deputy crown prince and favourite son of the ailing king, who even supporters say risks challenge from his royal peers. He is also embarking on an overhaul of the kingdom’s clientelist and paternalist economic management — by slashing energy subsidies, for example.

但他们倚赖的3样东西现在似乎都出现了短缺：缓慢但稳定的决策、家族凝聚力和用不完的现金。油价暴跌，现金储备正在减少。现在负责制定政策的是沙特副王储穆罕默德本萨勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman)，萨勒曼精力充沛，是年迈体衰的萨勒曼国王最得宠的儿子，但他缺乏经验，就连支持者们也说，他可能受到其他王子的挑战。他还在着手彻底改革沙特侍从主义(clientelist)和家长式经济管理方式，例如削减能源补贴。

Such reform is long overdue. But it is a narrative that speaks of limited reform as a technocratic bypass for intractable political and social problems. These problems will not go away. And the new leadership has not only gone on an expensive offensive abroad — from Yemen to Syria, and in billions of dollars of support for its Sunni allies from Egypt to Bahrain — but opened a new front at home.

此类改革早就应该推行。但看上去沙特似乎只是想把有限的改革作为绕过棘手政治和社会问题的技术手段。这些问题将不会消失。并且新的领导集团不仅在国外走上了一条代价高昂的攻击性道路（从也门到叙利亚，以及向从埃及到巴林的逊尼派盟友提供数十亿美元资助），还在国内开启新的战线。

Underlying it all, the bloody example the Saudis have made of Nimr, and their alarmed and bellicose response to Iranian swaggering across the Arab world, continue to give the impression that the House of Saud and the Wahhabis are competing with the radical jihadis of Isis as to who is best placed to keep down the Shia.

最根本的一点是，沙特处决尼米尔的血腥例子，以及他们对在整个阿拉伯世界耀武扬威的伊朗人的警惕和好斗的回应，持续给人们这样的印象：就谁是镇压什叶派的最佳人选，沙特王室和瓦哈比教派正在与激进的ISIS圣战组织展开竞争。