俄罗斯最艰巨的挑战 寡头能拯救俄罗斯吗
Twenty years ago, asmall group of Russian businessmen saved the country from a return tocommunism.
20年前，一小群俄罗斯商人拯救了这个国家，使之避免回到共产党统治。
Boris Yeltsin,physically and politically weak, was close to being beaten in the presidentialelection by Gennady Zyuganov.
在总统选举中，身体和政治上虚弱的鲍里斯.叶利钦(Boris Yeltsin)差点被根纳季.久加诺夫（Gennady Zyuganov，俄罗斯联邦共产党领导人——译者注）打败。
In the firstballot, Yeltsin led by just 3 per cent.
在第一轮投票中，叶利钦领先3个百分点。
The moneyand organisation the oligarchs brought to the party put him more than 13points ahead in the second and decisive vote.
在第二轮决定性的投票中，寡头们提供的资金和组织使他领先了逾13个百分点。
Now, in verydifferent circumstances, the oligarchs may need to intervene again.
如今，在非常不同的时代背景下，寡头们或许需要再次干预。
Russia is in aparlous state.
俄罗斯目前正处于危险之中。
Real incomes havefallen by 10 per cent in just a year.
实际收入在短短一年里下滑了10%。
The roubledepreciated 37 per cent and in real terms gross domestic product fell 3.7 percent, according to World Bank figures.
卢布下跌了37%；根据世界银行(World Bank)数据，实际国内生产总值(GDP)缩水3.7%。
Household incomesand investment fell sharply.
家庭收入和投资急剧下滑。
The trends havepersisted into 2016.
这种趋势延续到了2016年。
Forget the blusterof President Vladimir Putin and the military activities in Ukraine and Syria.
忘了俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔.普京(Vladimir Putin)的狠话以及在乌克兰和叙利亚的军事活动吧。
What was once asuperpower is now a country in decline.
昔日的超级大国现在成了衰落之国。
Many nations havesuffered from the fall in energy prices over the last two years but few havebeen more seriously affected than Russia.
过去两年，很多国家都遭受了能源价格下跌的影响，但是没有几个国家比俄罗斯受到的打击更严重。
The reason is itsoverwhelming dependence on the oil and gas sector, revenues from which accountfor half the national budget.
原因在于它对石油和天然气部门压倒性的依赖，来自该部门的财政收入支撑了国家预算的一半。
The effect of thefall in oil prices has been compounded by the loss of both volumes and value ingas sales.
除油价下滑的影响外，天然气销售规模缩减和价格下跌如同雪上加霜。
Europe is Russia’sprimary export market and falling gas demand (down 20 per cent over the lastdecade) combined with a worldwide surplus of supply has pushed prices down 65per cent in the last three years.
欧洲是俄罗斯主要的出口市场，天然气需求下滑（过去十年减少了20%）再加上全球范围供应过剩，使得过去三年天然气价格下降了65%。
To these exogenousfactors have been added the isolation and sanctions that have followed theannexation of Crimea.
除这些外部因素外，还有俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后遭到的孤立和制裁。
Such measures maynot have led to any reconsideration of policy in the Kremlin but they have hadan inexorably growing negative effect on the economy.
此类措施或许并没有促使克里姆林宫重审政策，但是它们对俄罗斯经济造成了日益消极的影响。
Fresh inwardinvestment is minimal, and in the areas of new technology that Russia so badlyneeds it is nonexistent.
新的外来投资极少，而在俄罗斯亟需的新技术领域完全不存在。
The internationalcompanies already present are keeping their heads down, hoping circumstanceswill change.
已经落地的跨国企业保持低姿态，企盼形势会有所改变。
But they are notrushing to put in more money.
但是它们不急于加大投资。
Mr Putin, who hasremained in power for most of the last 17 years on the back of relativelystrong oil and gas prices, can now only rely on the dangerous rhetoric ofnationalism, coupled with a determination to make convenient enemies of thewest, in particular the US.
在油价和天然气价格相对坚挺的帮助下，在过去17年的大部分时间掌握大权的普京，如今只能依赖于危险的民族主义言论、以及把西方（特别是美国）列为便利的敌对力量的决心。
The vicious andunnecessary conflict in Syria serves no practical purpose.
在叙利亚延续毫无必要的恶性冲突没有实际作用。
Russian interests,including its naval base on the Mediterranean coast of Syria, could easily havebeen protected within the terms of a peace agreement.
俄罗斯的利益——包括其在叙利亚地中海海岸的海军基地——可以在和平协议的条款下轻松得到保护。
But Mr Putin needsa continuing conflict to justify his position of power.
但是普京需要延续叙利亚的冲突来坐稳自己的权力宝座。
Why should theoligarchs take the risk of forcing a change in the Kremlin? The answer isself-interest — just as in 1996.
寡头们为何要冒险迫使克里姆林宫换人？答案是为了自身利益——就像1996年一样。
Several have lostlarge sums of money as the economy has declined.
随着俄罗斯经济下滑，一些寡头已经遭受了大量财富损失。
Although most havemanaged to extract their families and the bulk of their capital and moved toLondon or Paris, many still have substantial physical and economic assets inRussia.
尽管多数寡头成功地把家人和大部分资本转移至伦敦或巴黎，但是很多人在俄罗斯仍然拥有大量的实体和经济资产。
Those arevulnerable to a collapse of confidence in the economy and potentialexpropriation by a desperate government.
这些资产容易受到经济信心崩塌的影响，也可能会被走投无路的政府没收。
Some even fear thelong arm of Moscow will reach out to force them to hand back some of the moneythey have taken out.
一些人甚至担心莫斯科方面的触角会伸向境外，强迫他们返还已经转移的一部分资金。
For many there isa reputational concern.
很多寡头还有名誉上的顾虑。
To be Russian isnot a label that secures trust or warm acceptance.
身为俄罗斯人的标签无助于得到信任或热情接受。
Some doors havealready been closed to investment from the country.
来自俄罗斯的投资已经吃了一些闭门羹。
In the second USpresidential debate last week, Hillary Clinton talked about the need to findmore leverage to force Moscow to change its behaviour.
在美国总统竞选第二场辩论中，希拉里.克林顿(Hillary Clinton)谈到了寻找更多手段强迫莫斯科改变的必要性。
That can only beeconomic in nature and would directly affect the oligarchs and their businessinterests including, in extremis, their right to travel freely in the US.
这些手段的性质只可能是经济的，它们会直接影响寡头及其商业利益，在极端情况下还包括他们在美国自由旅行的权利。
As American robberbarons learnt at the end of the 19th century, once you have made your money –by whatever means – you have a keen interest in the enforcement of the rule oflaw to protect your assets.
就像美国强盗资本家在19世纪末学到的那样，一旦你赚了钱——无论以何种方式——你就会对维护法治有强烈兴趣，以保护你的资产。
The understandingreached more than a decade ago between the oligarchs and Mr Putin after initialtension which saw some arrested or exiled was that he would make Russia asecure place in and from which to do business and that the oligarchs would stayout of politics and sustain him in power.
十多年前，寡头们和普京之间在经历了最初的紧张后（一些人被逮捕或流放）达成共识：普京会确保俄罗斯成为做生意的安全之地，而寡头们会远离政治并支撑他掌权。
The president hasbroken his side of that bargain.
现在普京背弃了他在那笔交易下的义务。
What would achange of leadership mean? In essence, a change of priorities.
领导层变更将意味着什么？在本质上，这意味着改变轻重缓急。
Economics wouldbecome more important than military adventures or any conflict with Europe orthe US.
经济会比军事冒险或与欧美冲突更受重视。
Deals would bedone to settle the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria to bring an end to sanctions.
签订解决乌克兰和叙利亚冲突的协议，结束制裁。
The neglectedagenda of establishing closer links with Europe would be revived.
重启近年被忽视的与欧洲建立更紧密关系的议程。
Changing Russiainternally would be the greatest challenge.
从内部改变俄罗斯将是最艰巨的挑战。
A technocrat wouldbe put in charge.
将有一名技术统治论者掌权。
The securityapparatus of the state would remain in place – the oligarchs are too smart tomess with the FSB, the KGB’s successor agency – but there would be a reductionin military spending and procurement which has risen rapidly in the last threeyears.
国家的安全机器将继续保留——精明的寡头们不会插手俄罗斯联邦安全局（FSB，前身是苏联克格勃(KGB)）的事务——但是军事支出和装备采购将缩减（过去三年这方面的支出迅速增长）。
There wouldinstead be incentives for inward investment, helped by the weakness of therouble and the promise of a more more economically and politically stablegovernment in Moscow.
同时，俄罗斯将在疲软卢布和承诺建立在经济和政治上更稳定的政府的帮助下推出吸引外资的刺激政策。
On top of that, anew wave of privatisation could begin.
此外，俄罗斯将开始新一轮私有化浪潮。
No doubt theoligarchs would participate by bringing back some of the capital they haveexported.
寡头们必然会参与其中，将之前外流的部分资金转移回国内。
Russia would notsuddenly become an open, liberal democracy but the dangerous illusion that itis still a superpower would be quietly dropped and the world would be a saferplace.
俄罗斯不会在一夜间变成开放、自由的民主国家，但是它会默默放下自己仍是超级大国的危险幻觉，世界将变得更加安全。
Given the scale ofthe country’s problems and the risks of the current tensions escalating, animperfect transfer of power would be better than allowing the status quo todeteriorate further.
鉴于俄罗斯问题的严重性以及当前紧张局势升级的风险，不完美的权力移交也好过现状进一步恶化。
